16th July 1944. Minsk yellow Russian Soviet Socialist Republic. Archival footage shows a long column of armed Soviet partisans marching through liberated Minsk. Many wear a mix of red army uniforms and civilian clothing. Some carry captured German weapons. By summer 1944, the partisan movement in Barus alone counted roughly 374,000 fighters in 1,255 units.
Across all occupied Soviet territory, hundreds of thousands more had served in similar formations. Soviet publications credit these units with derailing more than 20,000 trains, disabling over 4,000 armored vehicles, and inflicting more than a million casualties on German forces and collaborators. At this parade, party leaders, Red Army officers, and foreign journalists celebrate them as people’s avengers.
Yet simultaneously, NKVD and party organs are already planning the filtration and political screening of anyone who lived under occupation, including partisans. The same files that record their decorations will soon also record arrests. 22 June 1941. German army group center operations room. Situation maps show rapid advances toward Minsk and Smolinsk.
Within days, Weremach panzer groups achieve breakthrough after breakthrough. At Bawisto and Minsk, massive encirclement battles trap hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers. The German advance moves at unprecedented speed. Forward units cover 50 km per day in some sectors. Soviet command structures collapse faster than messengers can report the situation.
By December 1941, several million Soviet prisoners of war are in German hands. The exact figure remains disputed, but German records acknowledge capturing approximately 3 million Soviet soldiers in the first 6 months of Operation Barbarosa. Vast territories, including all of Bellarus and most of Ukraine, fall under German control.
The occupied zone stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea, encompassing roughly 1 million km and over 60 million Soviet citizens. The strategic collapse leaves behind scattered Red Army units, NKVD detachments, and party cadres cut off from main forces. Some groups are entire battalions that escaped encirclement. Others are small teams of a dozen men.
Stalin’s initial focus remains on restoring front lines, not yet on organized partisan warfare. In the first weeks, Moscow issues no systematic instructions for resistance in occupied territories. The assumption is that the weremocked will be stopped and pushed back within months. In the administrative vacuum, some stranded groups, local party activists, and villagers form ad hoc partisan bans.
Bellarusian figures show approximately 12,000 people in roughly 230 units active by end of 1941 in Bellarus alone. These early formations vary enormously in size and capability. Some consist of a party secretary and a handful of collective farm workers. Others are organized around Red Army officers with military training and discipline.
Early actions include raiding small German outposts, killing local collaborators, cutting telephone lines. A typical operation might involve 10 to 15 partisans attacking a village police station, seizing weapons and food, then disappearing into nearby forests. German security assumptions anticipate rear area unrest, but consider it manageable by a mix of Felgian armory, police units, and local auxiliaries.
We mocked planning documents from spring 1941 allocate minimal forces for rear security expecting the Soviet state to collapse completely. Reality proves different. Initial reports from security commands already mentioned bandit activity and civilian hostility. A German security division report from July 1941 notes attacks on supply columns and ambushes of isolated vehicles.
Another report from August mentions that telephone lines are cut nightly in certain sectors, requiring constant repair details. The weremock has no systematic doctrine for dealing with this type of warfare. Most German officers expect partisan activity to fade as winter approaches and food becomes scarce. Early organizers include local party secretaries and Red Army officers named in regional histories.
One example is Tikkin Bumiskov, a collective farm manager who organized one of the first partisan detachments in Pinsk Oblast. Another is Vasili Kors, a former NKVD officer who formed a unit in southern Bellarus. These cadres focus on organizing supply, liaison, and intelligence. They operate without standardized doctrine or centralized support.
Communication with Moscow is sporadic or non-existent. Some groups go months without contact with Soviet authorities. Archival fragments reference early German situation reports listing bandampong bandit combat as an emerging task. A wearmocked rear area command document from September 1941 requests two additional security battalions to deal with increasing unrest.
Soviet directives call on party and NKVD personnel in occupied areas to form resistance detachments in the enemy rear. A directive from the central committee dated 29 June 1941 instructs party organizations in threatened areas to create underground cells and prepare for prolonged resistance. The combination of military collapse, harsh occupation policies, and existing party structures creates conditions for a growing but still scattered partisan movement.
German occupation policies accelerate recruitment. Mass executions, forced labor deportations, and systematic looting drive civilians toward the partisans. Villages burned in reprisal actions send survivors into the forests. Low early effectiveness stems from poor arms, lack of radios, and absence of central coordination. Most partisan groups possess only captured German rifles and a few machine guns.
Ammunition is scarce. Medical supplies are almost non-existent. By early 1942, rear area German commands already request additional security battalions, indicating that the bandit problem is no longer local, even before Moscow has organized the partisans as a systematic weapon. A German Army Group Center report from February 1942 acknowledges that partisan activity has increased significantly over winter and recommends establishing permanent garrisons in key villages along supply routes.
30 May 1942, Moscow. A state defense committee decree sits on Stalin’s desk. Behind it, a map shows partisan activity zones spreading across occupied territories. The decree establishes the central headquarters of the partisan movement known as TSSHPD. This marks a fundamental shift in Soviet approach to irregular warfare.
What began as spontaneous resistance will now become a centrally managed military instrument. Pantaliman Panonareno becomes head with subordination to staff and the party apparatus. Panamareno is an experienced party administrator having previously served as first secretary of the Bellarusian Communist Party.
His appointment signals that partisan warfare will be tightly controlled by party mechanisms. The headquarters staff includes representatives from the Red Army General Staff, NKVD, and Party Central Committee. This ensures coordination across all relevant Soviet institutions. Formal tasks assigned include disrupting communications, gathering intelligence on German troop movements, and supporting regular operations through timed sabotage.
The partisan movement comes under tighter party control. Political sections and commasaars are installed in every major formation. Their job is to ensure ideological discipline and monitor commanders for any signs of independence or deviation. Every partisan brigade now requires approval from TSSHPD for major operations.
Republican and front level headquarters are created for Bellarusian, Ukrainian, Baltic and Leningrad regions. Each Republican headquarters coordinates partisan activity within its territory and serves as liaison with Moscow. The Bellarusian headquarters becomes the largest and most effective, eventually coordinating hundreds of brigades.
Liaison officers, training sections, and logistics branches take shape. Officers are selected from Red Army and NKVD personnel with relevant experience. Some are former staff officers. Others are intelligence operatives. Technology and logistics improve systematically. Night flights deliver weapons, explosives, medicines, and radios through air supply operations.
Long range bombers, primarily P2 and PS84 aircraft, fly missions deep into occupied territory. These flights are dangerous. German night fighters and anti-aircraft batteries shoot down many supply planes. Despite losses, the airbridge gradually strengthens. By late 1942, Moscow delivers several tons of supplies nightly to major partisan zones.
Training becomes standardized around demolition techniques, railway sabotage methods, and secure communications. TSSHPD establishes training camps in rear areas where partisan commanders and specialists receive instruction. Demolition courses teach proper placement of charges to maximize rail damage.
Intelligence courses cover observation techniques, coding, and radio operation. Political courses emphasize party discipline and ideological education. Numbers of radios and aircraft remain limited, but throughput increases over 1942 through 43. By mid1943, most major partisan brigades possess at least one radio, enabling direct communication with Moscow.
The founding directive defines the main task as disorganizing and disrupting the enemy rear by attacking communications depots and command points. Later 1942 orders clarify priorities, railways, bridges, fuel depots. A directive from July 1942 explicitly states that railway sabotage must become the primary focus of partisan operations.
This reflects Soviet understanding that German logistics depend on rail transport. Roads in occupied territories are primitive and become impassible during spring and autumn mud seasons. German commands still plan to rely on security divisions and local auxiliaries. Expecting to stabilize the rear through reprisals and terror.
Weremach doctrine assumes that sufficiently harsh collective punishment will deter civilian support for partisans. Villages suspected of aiding resistance are burned. Hostages are executed at ratios of 50 to 100 civilians for each German killed. These policies prove counterproductive, driving more people toward partisan ranks.
Meanwhile, TSSHPD aims to coordinate hundreds of detached groups into an operational instrument. Central planning allows for synchronized operations. Multiple partisan brigades can now attack different points on the same railway line. simultaneously making repair more difficult. Intelligence gathered by one unit can be shared with others.
Partisan numbers across occupied USSR rise into the hundreds of thousands by late 1942. Bellarusian partisan strength grows from approximately 12,000 in late 1941 to over 60,000 by end of 1942. Ukrainian partisan numbers increase from roughly 20,000 to over 50,000 in the same period. In September 1942, a TSSHPD order explicitly moves railway sabotage to top priority, an administrative line that foreshadows the mass rail wars that will seek to influence entire campaigns.
The order includes detailed instructions on target selection, optimal charge placement, and timing operations to coincide with Red Army offensives. This document transforms partisan warfare from harassment to operational support. 1942 Army Group Center rear Brians and Bellarus forests. A German security column moves on a forest road.
Trucks and mounted Felgian armory visible. The column travels slowly expecting ambush. Soldiers scan the tree line nervously. Simultaneously, partisan teams place explosives under rails elsewhere. The explosive charge consists of captured German explosives or Soviet-made demolition blocks delivered by air. Placement requires precision.
Partisans calculate where the locomotive will be when the charge detonates. Partisan methods follow a catalog developed through trial and error. Cutting telephone and telegraph lines disrupts German communications. A single partisan with wire cutters can sever a line in seconds, forcing repair crews to search kilometers of wire, destroying small bridges and culverts blocks roads for hours or days.
Partisans use improvised explosives, mines, or simply manual demolition. Derailing local trains and lightly guarded military transports becomes routine. A properly placed charge can send an entire locomotive off the tracks. attacking isolated garrisons, escort detachments, and small convoys yields weapons and supplies while demonstrating German vulnerability.
TSSHpd manual standardized charge placement, detonator use, and sabotage patterns. A manual distributed in late 1942 provides diagrams showing optimal positions for rail charges. Emphasis falls on maximum damage for minimal explosives, targeting joints, key spans, and junctions. The manual explains that destroying a rail joint requires less explosive than destroying a solid section, but causes equivalent disruption.
Attacking junctions where multiple lines converge multiplies the effect, forcing Germans to reroute traffic through congested alternative routes. German antipartisan doctrine combines were wearmocked and SS sweep operations with security divisions, ordnungazi, and auxiliary battalions. A typical antipartisan operation involves several thousand troops forming a cordon around a suspected partisan zone, then systematically sweeping through the area.
Major antipartisan operations often involve several thousand troops supported by artillery and air directed into forest areas. Operation Bamberg in March 1942 employs over 5,000 German and auxiliary troops in Bellarus. Operation Handover in June 1942 uses 6,000. These operations kill many civilians, destroy villages, but rarely eliminate partisan formations.
Partisans typically receive warning and evacuate into deeper forests or across operational boundaries. Historian estimates suggest that about 10% of German manpower on the Eastern Front engages in rear security and antipartisan operations by 1942 through 43. This means divisions not available for frontline duty. A German infantry division assigned to rear security cannot participate in offensive operations.
The 2002nd security division, for example, spends all of 1942 fighting partisans in Bellarus rather than supporting frontline combat. Similar divisions are tied down across the occupied territories. German situation reports note that partisan attacks seriously interfere with the exploitation of occupied territories, forcing permanent bannon beam.
An army group center security report from October 1942 states that partisan activity makes it impossible to exploit agricultural resources in several districts. Food collection is disrupted. Factories cannot operate. Administrative control exists only along major roads and in large towns. TSSHPD reports claim hundreds of transports of food and raw materials disrupted in designated regions.
A Bellarusian headquarters report from November 1942 claims 320 trains attacked or derailed in the previous quarter. Soviet reports tend to aggregate small actions into very large numbers. A single incident might be reported by multiple units, creating duplicate counts. Success is sometimes exaggerated to demonstrate effectiveness to Moscow.
German reports sometimes undercount or label missing as desertions or accidents. We mocked records distinguish between killed in action, missing and died of wounds. Missing soldiers may have deserted, been captured, or been killed without witnesses. This makes exact casualty figures difficult to establish. Early 1942 through early 1943, partisan activity grows but remains regionally uneven.
Some areas are effectively cleared by severe reprisals. In western Ukraine, German antipartisan operations combined with nationalist underground violence reduce Soviet partisan presence significantly. Others become semi-permanent partisan zones. In southern Bellarus, forests provide cover for large partisan formations that establish quasi governmental control over rural areas.
The Ushuchi partisan zone controls several hundred square kilm with minimal German interference. Partisan attacks already affect local logistics and occupation policies, but are not yet decisive in major operations. German offensives at Stalenrad and in the Caucases proceed despite partisan activity. German retaliatory actions, village burnings, mass executions create both terror and recruitment opportunities.
The burning of Ken village in March 1943 kills 149 civilians, including 75 children. Such actions generate bitter hatred and drive survivors toward partisan ranks. By the end of 1942, TSSHPD concludes that only large centrally coordinated railway campaigns, not isolated actions, can significantly alter the operational balance, setting the stage for the rail war.
Planning begins for mass sabotage operations involving thousands of partisan fighters attacking railways simultaneously across hundreds of kilome. This concept will be tested in summer 1943. 14th July 1943 occupied Bellarus, Smolinsk, and Briansk regions. Nighttime top- down diagrams and archival photos show partisan groups placing charges on a railway embankment.
A simple graphic illustrates how cutting one segment halts multiple trains. Each team consists of five to 10 fighters. One serves as lookout, two handle explosives, others provide security against German patrols. The charges are timed to detonate after the team withdraws to safety. Strategic context includes the battle of Korsk in July 1943 and subsequent Soviet offensives toward Oral, Briansk, and Smalinsk.
The battle of Korsk beginning 5 July 1943 becomes the largest tank battle in history. German forces commit 17 Panzer divisions and 3,000 tanks. Soviet defenses require constant resupply of ammunition, fuel, and reinforcements. Stafka needs to delay German reserves and complicate withdrawal. Any disruption to German logistics supports Soviet operations.
Order number 0042 outlines the start of a mass sabotage campaign called rail war. The operation coordinates over a wide ark in the rear of army group center and north. The order signed by Verashilof as TSSHPD representative instructs all partisan formations to prepare for simultaneous attacks on railway infrastructure. Specific targets are assigned to each brigade.
Coordination is achieved through radio communications and pre-arranged timing. The operation is planned to begin on the night of 14 to 15 July as Soviet forces launch offensives following the German defeat at Korsk. Soviet and Bellarusian commemorative sources report up to 10,000 explosive attacks in a single night.
Over 200,000 rails destroyed by midepptember with actions along a 900 km 560 m sector. These figures appear in official Soviet military histories and are repeated in postwar commemorative literature. Modern historians question whether all reported actions actually occurred or whether some units inflated reports.
However, German records confirm massive disruption during this period. Destroyed rail means damaged track requiring repair time depending on damage level. A rail broken at a joint can be replaced in a few hours if spare rails are available. A rail shattered by explosives requires cutting away damaged sections and welding in replacements, taking much longer.
If multiple breaks occur on the same line, repair crews must prioritize and work sequentially. If rail stocks are depleted, damaged sections may be cannibalized from branch lines. This creates cascading delays throughout the network. German transport officers had calculated that partisan interference would remain a local nuisance.
Pre-war and early war German planning assumed that security forces could protect key infrastructure. Railway guards, armored trains, and regular patrols were considered sufficient deterrence. Reports now indicate major delays. rerouting to secondary lines and heavy pressure on rail repair units. A German railway directorate report from late July 1943 describes the situation as critical and requests emergency allocation of repair materials and personnel.
TSSHpd reports stress that rail war must coincide with the Red Army’s offensive and prevent the enemy’s transfer of reserves. The concept is that disrupting railways will slow German movement of reinforcements to threaten sectors. If a Panzer division requires 5 days to reach the front instead of two, Soviet forces gain three additional days to exploit breakthroughs.
German Railway Command reports lament unprecedented sabotage actions requiring constant repair work. An August 1943 report states that over 100 sections of track require repair simultaneously, exceeding available repair capacity. Types of charges used, typical rail intervals chosen, and methods for coordinating actions across many detachments demonstrate how relatively small teams could halt long-d distanceance traffic by targeting key nodes.
Partisan groups place charges every few hundred meters along critical lines. Even if some charges fail to detonate, the successful explosions create multiple breaks. German repair trains can fix one or two brakes relatively quickly, but 10 or 20 breaks on a single line overwhelm repair capacity. Targeting stations and junctions causes additional disruption by damaging switches and blocking multiple tracks.
Rail war links to observable delays and disruption in German attempts to reinforce Korsk region and stabilize the Smolinsk line. German units ordered to move from quiet sectors to threatened areas report significant delays. The movement of major formations that should take 3 to 4 days extends to a week or more. Other factors Allied bombing of rail networks, fuel shortages also play roles.
The combined bomber offensive attacks German rail networks in Western Europe. Fuel shortages force Germans to prioritize coal burning locomotives. Nevertheless, partisan sabotage in the east creates distinct and measurable impact. Soviet sources claim that in some sectors, rail war reduced German traffic by up to 40%.
Modern historians treat these numbers cautiously, but German reports indirectly support them by documenting severe strain on the transport system. A German Railway Command report from September 1943 states that throughput on certain lines has declined by approximately 35% compared to spring levels.
The report attributes this primarily to sabotage and security concerns, secondarily to material shortages. September through November 1943, Bellarus, Baltic region, parts of Russia and Crimea. archive map from a Bellarusian headquarters with red pencil marks along rail lines. Camera lingers on handwritten target lists for bridges and junctions.
The map shows the railway network as a web of lines converging on key nodes. Red marks indicate priority targets. Annotations in cerillic specify assigned brigades and plan timing. With Soviet offensives advancing after Corsk, TSSHPD launches operation concert to sustain pressure on German transport. The name concert suggests coordination and simultaneous action like an orchestra.
Operations extend to Bellarus, parts of the Baltic region and rear areas near Smealinsk and Oral. The geographical scope is even broader than rail war encompassing territories from Leningrad Oblast to northern Ukraine. This reflects growing partisan strength and improved coordination capabilities. Bellarusian and Russian sources report approximately 150,000 rails destroyed, over 1,000 trains derailed, 87 locomotives, 6,360 wagons and tanks damaged, and 72 railway bridges demolished during concert.
These are aggregate figures and may contain double counting. The statistics come from reports submitted by partisan brigades to Republican headquarters, then compiled into overall assessments. Some incidents may be reported by multiple units. Nevertheless, the scale of disruption is undeniable. Bellarus serves as core of the campaign, but examples appear from Baltic forests and southern sectors.
Bellarusian partisan brigades account for approximately 60% of reported actions. The Bellarusian partisan movement has grown to over 120,000 fighters by autumn 1943, organized into nearly 200 brigades. Some areas have dense partisan networks where Soviet authority effectively supersedes German control. Others, particularly where German counterinsurgency has been severe, see fewer actions.
In western Ukraine, where Ukrainian nationalist underground competes with Soviet partisans, concert operations are limited. Field commanders demand priority for troop and ammunition trains. Wearmocked operational orders now specify that military transports receive maximum protection and priority routing. German security forces establish fortified positions along key rail sections.
Armored trains patrol vulnerable segments. Rail authorities warned there are not enough guards, repair crews, or spare rails. A railway director report from October 1943 calculates that current damage rates will exhaust reserve rail stocks by spring 1944 unless supply allocations increase significantly. Antipartisan operations intensify.
Train guards and armored trains are deployed. Additional security battalions are transferred from Western Europe to the Eastern Front. Operation Wolf Schluck in November 1943 commits 8,000 troops to clearing partisan zones in eastern Bellarus. The operation kills approximately 2,000 people, mostly civilians, and temporarily reduces partisan activity.
However, partisan formations withdraw and regroup, resuming operations within weeks. Bellarusian HQ reports describe goals as systematic paralysis of enemy transport networks. The objective is not merely harassment, but sustained disruption that degrades German operational capability. German transport statistics show declines in throughput and increased turnaround times on certain lines.
Average freight train speed on Army Group Center rear area lines declines from approximately 30 km hour in early 1943 to approximately 20 km hour by year’s end. This reflects both track damage and increased security procedures requiring slower movement and frequent stops. Repeated sabotage of the same corridors imposes cumulative costs.
Each repair consumes rails, manpower, and time. Each derailment damages rolling stock already in short supply. German locomotive availability on the Eastern front declines throughout 1943. Some losses result from Soviet air attacks and artillery fire near the front. Others result from partisan sabotage deep in rear areas.
Damaged locomotives must be sent to repair facilities, reducing operational fleet size. Damaged wagons accumulate at sidings, creating bottlenecks. Concert ties to the difficulty German forces face in stabilizing front lines in late 1943, especially in the central sector. Soviet forces liberate Sinsk in September, Gomel in November.
German withdrawal requires moving units, equipment, and supplies westward under constant pressure. Railway disruption complicates these movements. Units arrive at new positions with depleted ammunition and fuel. Even when trains run, scheduling becomes unpredictable. Trains expected to arrive at specific times are delayed by hours or days, disrupting operational planning as Soviet headquarters plan operation bagration for summer 1944.
TSSHPD proposes that Bellarusian partisans act as a deacto forthront in the German rear, an idea that will partly be realized. The concept emerges from lessons learned in rail war and concert. If partisans can systematically disrupt German logistics and communications during a major offensive, they effectively function as an additional front requiring German resources.
Planners begin coordinating partisan operations more tightly with Red Army movements. 1943 through 1944, Moscow, Berlin, later historical debates. Split screen shows Soviet partisan report table listing destroyed trains and enemy killed and a German security report table listing losses in antipartisan actions. The contrasting documents illustrate fundamental problems in assessing partisan effectiveness.
Each side measures different things for different purposes. Soviet claims present wartime and later statistics. More than 20,000 trains damaged or derailed, over 4,000 armored vehicles disabled, and more than a million enemy personnel and accompllices killed, wounded or captured. These figures appear in official Soviet military encyclopedias published in the 1970s and 80s.
This includes collaborators and local auxiliaries, not just mocked. The term accompllices encompasses local police, administrators, and anyone deemed to support the occupation. This dramatically inflates the numbers. German security and rear area reports list casualties from antipartisan operations in the tens of thousands over the war with many more missing or wounded.
A comprehensive study of German Security Force records estimates approximately 35,000 German military and police personnel killed by partisans across all occupied territories from 1941 to 45. This excludes collaborators and local auxiliaries. Recordeping remains incomplete. Categories such as missing, deserters, and accidental losses complicate counts.
German documentation often distinguishes between combat deaths, deaths from disease and accidents, and missing inaction. Methodological problems include differences between counting kills, wounded prisoners, and accompllices. Partisan reports had incentives to emphasize success. Brigade commanders needed to justify their resource allocation and demonstrate value to Moscow.
Exaggerated claims brought recognition, promotions, and additional support. German reports often underestimated or reclassified losses. Commanders had incentives to minimize partisan effectiveness to avoid appearing incompetent. Deaths were sometimes attributed to disease or accidents rather than enemy action. A Soviet summary explicitly states that partisans destroyed, wounded, and captured more than a million fascists and their accompllices.
The phrasing is significant. Including accompllices vastly increases the total. A German rear area report from Army Group Center indicates several thousand dead in a given period, but attributes many losses to disease and accidents. Typhus epidemics killed thousands of German soldiers in occupied territories. Malnutrition and poor sanitation caused widespread illness.
These deaths are sometimes difficult to separate from combat casualties in statistical compilations. Modern estimates present consensus that direct German combat deaths from partisan actions are probably in the tens of thousands, not hundreds of thousands, though exact numbers are disputed. Respected historians such as Leonid Granovich estimate approximately 30 to 40,000 German military deaths directly attributable to partisan actions.
Ben Shepard’s research on rear area warfare suggests similar figures. Focus on body count alone misses other impacts. Reducing partisan effectiveness to a casualty count ignores broader operational effects. Partisan effectiveness reframes in three quantifiable areas. Diversion of German troops to security and antipartisan duties, persistent damage to infrastructure and rolling stock, and psychological and administrative costs of permanent rear insecurity.
The first area is measurable. Approximately 10% of German forces on the Eastern front, roughly 400,000 men at peak, are engaged in rear security. These troops cannot participate in offensive operations. The opportunity cost is significant. The second area involves infrastructure damage. Thousands of trains derailed, hundreds of bridges destroyed, countless telegraph lines cut.
The cumulative effect on German logistics is demonstrable through transport statistics showing declining efficiency. The third area involves psychological costs. Rear areas that should be safe become zones of constant threat. German supply troops, administrators, and support personnel operate under stress. Occupation policies become harsher, alienating the population further.
By 1944, Soviet propaganda emphasizes enemy dead. Pravda articles celebrate partisan heroes who allegedly killed dozens or hundreds of Germans. These stories serve morale purposes. German planners focus on something else entirely. Entire divisions immobilized in the rear, unavailable at decisive fronts. Wearmocked operational planning documents from 1944 indicate frustration at inability to concentrate forces due to security requirements.
Divisions needed at the front remain tied down in antipartisan operations. June through July 1944 Bellarus Palotsk Vepsk Minsk sectors operational map of operation bagration overlaid with shaded areas denoting partisan controlled forests and villages. The map shows Soviet front lines in blue, German positions in black, and partisan zones in red.
The partisan zones lie deep behind German lines surrounding key communication nodes. Operation Bagration aims at the destruction of Army Group Center. Named after a Russian general from the Napoleonic Wars, the operation begins 23 June 1944. Soviet planning integrates partisan actions, communications disruption, seizure of crossings, guidance for advancing units.
This represents unprecedented coordination between regular forces and irregulars. Partisan operations are scheduled to begin simultaneously with artillery preparation, amplifying confusion in German rear areas. Bellarusian data shows approximately 374,000 partisans in 1,255 units by summer 1944. This makes the Bellarusian partisan movement larger than several Red Army fronts in terms of numerical strength.
Roughly 180,000 will later join the Red Army. Many are former soldiers with military training. Others are civilians who spent years learning guerilla tactics. Brigades are grouped by sectors to support specific fronts and armies. The first Bellarusian front coordinates with southern partisan brigades.
The second Bellarusian front coordinates with central brigades. The third Bellarusian front coordinates with northern brigades. Types of actions during bag ration include blowing bridges and culverts on withdrawal routes, cutting communications between German corps and divisions, attacking retreating columns, and seizing villages ahead of the front.
In the night of 19 to 20 June, partisan brigades launch coordinated attacks on railway lines across Bellarus. Over 10,000 separate actions occur, paralyzing German logistics. When bag ration begins 3 days later, German units cannot move reinforcements or supplies effectively. Soviet accounts refer to the partisan movement as the fourth Bellarusian front.
This terminology appears in postwar Soviet military histories and memoirs. It reflects the scale and coordination of partisan operations. German reports describe large bandit zones where control has effectively been lost. An army group center intelligence report from early June 1944 identifies extensive areas where German authority exists only along major roads and in fortified towns.
The surrounding countryside is hostile territory. Partisan formations establish rudimentary Soviet administration in some zones. Village councils kulka’s reactivation basic courts in the lep partisan zone. Over 100 villages are under partisan control by June 1944. Village councils collect taxes, organize food distribution, and recruit for partisan units.
Kaucazes operate under partisan supervision, producing food for partisan brigades and civilian population. Courts try collaborators and criminals. This creates a parallel Soviet state structure in occupied territory. Their role includes providing food and intelligence for the advancing Red Army. Partisan scouts identify German positions and report troop movements.
Local guides show Red Army units through forests and swamps, bypassing German strong points. Food stocks accumulated by partisans feed advancing Soviet troops, reducing supply line burdens. Partisan actions linked to specific operational problems for the Germans. Broken lines of retreat, encirclement of formations, loss of bridges needed for counterattacks.
A specific example illustrates partisan impact. The German 9inth Army attempts to withdraw west through Babruisk. Partisan brigades destroy bridges over the Barazina River and ambush columns on approach roads. When Red Army units reach Babruisk, they find German formations trapped between Soviet armor and impassible river crossings.
Approximately 40,000 German soldiers are killed or captured. Similar scenarios repeat across Bellarus. While the Red Army’s main offensive power comes from regular formations and logistics, partisans materially complicate German attempts to respond. German casualties in operation bagration exceed 400,000 killed, wounded or captured.
Army group center effectively ceases to exist as a coherent force. Soviet forces advance 600 km in 5 weeks, reaching the outskirts of Warsaw. Partisan contributions while secondary to Red Army operations demonstrabably enhance Soviet success. When Bagration ends with the near total destruction of Army Group Center, many of the forest fighters move into liberated towns as victors only to find that their next assignment will be to police the rear for the state they helped restore.
1943 through 1944, Bellarus, Western Ukraine, Baltic region. an internal NKVD or party report on a partisan brigade with underlined passages criticizing discipline and relations with civilians. The report dated March 1944 describes unauthorized requisitions, excessive alcohol consumption, and conflicts with local population.
Red ink underlines indicate party oversight concerns. Documented incidents of looting, violence against civilians, and uncontrolled requisitioning emerge in internal reports. Some partisan groups devolve into banditry in certain periods, especially where control is weak. In Western Ukraine, partisan detachments sometimes pillage villages for food and supplies without proper authorization.
Women are assaulted. Property is stolen. Local populations in some areas fear partisans as much as Germans. Such incidents are documented in NKVD reports and postwar testimonies. Political commisars and NKVD liaison officers expand presence in partisan formations to address these problems. By 1944, every significant partisan brigade has political officers monitoring behavior.
Orders from TSSHPD stress the need for strict discipline, prohibition of self-willed executions, and respect for Soviet law. A directive from November 1943 explicitly forbids unauthorized executions and requires that all death sentences be approved by brigade commanders with political officer concurrence.
In western Bellarus, Western Ukraine, and the Baltic, clashes with Polish home army units and nationalist undergrounds occur. Conflicting allegiances complicate the picture. Soviet partisans versus non-S Soviet resistance movements. The Polish home army loyal to the Polish government in exile in London operates in western Bellarus and Ukraine.
Ukrainian nationalist partisans primarily the Ukrainian insurgent army known as UPA control large areas of western Ukraine. Lithuanian and Latvian nationalist movements resist both Germans and Soviets in the Baltic. Violent clashes occur between these movements and Soviet partisans. In Volania, Western Ukraine, Soviet partisan detachments fight UPA units for control of villages and supplies. Both sides commit atrocities.
Villages are burned. Civilians suspected of supporting the other side are executed. Polish and Ukrainian nationalist undergrounds view Soviet partisans as agents of Russian imperialism. Soviet partisans view nationalists as fascist collaborators. These conflicts continue even after German withdrawal, complicating postwar pacification.
TSSHpd or party directives state that any violation of Soviet law toward civilians is punishable. Internal NKVD reports nevertheless log repeated cases of abuse, sometimes leading to arrests or reorganization of units. A January 1944 report describes the arrest of a partisan brigade commander for systematic extortion and murder of civilians.
The commander is tried and executed. His brigade is disbanded and personnel reassigned. Such cases demonstrate that authorities recognize problems but also show problems are widespread enough to require frequent intervention. Official publications present a unified people’s war with harmonious relations between partisans and population.
Soviet propaganda films and posters show partisans welcomed joyfully by villagers. Memoirs published during Soviet period emphasize mutual support and shared sacrifice. Internal documents show friction, especially in regions with strong pre-war antis-siet sentiment or competing undergrounds. In Baltic republics, which were forcibly incorporated into the USSR only in 1940, many civilians view Soviet partisans as occupiers rather than liberators.
These contradictions armed groups with local authority, mixed discipline, and political complexity will inform postwar suspicion. From Stalin’s perspective, any armed structure not fully under peace time bureaucratic control is a potential threat. Partisan commanders accustomed to independent decision-making might resist tight party control after the war.
Partisan fighters who survived years in the forests might question authority. Contact with foreign influences, Polish underground, Western agents, German propaganda might have contaminated ideological purity. As front lines move west and the USSR reoccupies its pre-war borders and beyond, the very organs that supplied partisans in the forests begin cataloging them for filtration and political assessment.
Party and NKVD organs that coordinated partisan warfare now prepare to investigate the very people they armed. The transition from war to peace requires transforming independent guerrillas into obedient Soviet citizens. This transformation will prove difficult and for some impossible. Mid1944 through 1945 Minsk Kiev Vnius regional centers.
A post- liberation table lists how many partisans are transferred to Red Army units, militia and NKVD formations in a given oblast. The table compiled by Bellarusian party authorities in August 1944 shows precise figures for each district. Columns indicate numbers joining Red Army, entering militia, assigned to NKVD or demobilized.
In Bellarus, approximately 180,000 partisans join Red Army units. Integration occurs rapidly. Entire partisan brigades are redesated as rifle regiments or divisions. Former partisan commanders become Red Army officers. Partisans with military experience receive ranks corresponding to their responsibilities.
Those without prior service enter as enlisted soldiers. Tens of thousands more enter militia and internal security forces. Militia forces handle local policing, maintain order, and pursue remaining German stragglers. Similar processes occur in Ukraine and Baltic republics. Ukrainian partisan numbers joining the Red Army exceed 70,000.
Baltic partisan integration is more problematic due to widespread nationalist resistance. Former partisans are used to hunt remaining German groups, collaborators, and rival undergrounds. They know the terrain and local networks, making them valuable for early post-lberation control. Former partisans guide NKVD operations against nationalist underground in western Ukraine and Baltic states.
Their forest skills translate directly to counterinsurgency operations. They understand how underground movements operate because they operated the same way. Bellarusian party and government reports described former partisans as valuable cadres and emphasize their heroism. Awards, decorations, and positions in local administration follow.
Thousands receive Hero of the Soviet Union medals. Tens of thousands receive orders of Lenin, Red Banner, and other decorations. Some become district party secretaries, collective farm chairman, or industrial managers. The party rewards service with advancement opportunities. NKVD and party correspondents notes worries about independence, weak discipline, and exposure to non-siet influences during occupation.
Internal party documents from late 1944 express concern about partisan commanders who became accustomed to operating autonomously. Some commanders built personal followings, distributing captured goods and making decisions without consulting higher authorities. This independence is dangerous in a system requiring absolute obedience.
Exposure to non-siet influences during occupation raises questions. Did partisans interact with Germans, with nationalist undergrounds, with Western agents? Any such contact creates suspicion. Some commanders are considered too influential or too close to their local bases. Commanders who enjoy genuine popular support might use that support to resist party directives.
A commander who saved a village from reprisals becomes a local hero, potentially more influential than the district party secretary. This situation threatens proper party control. A report or resolution stresses the need to place former partisans under firm party control and to verify their wartime behavior.
Assigning former partisans to police and NKVD units subjects them to stricter oversight, but also places them at the front line of postwar repression. Former partisans serve in units that hunt nationalist underground fighters in western Ukraine. They participate in deportation operations against suspect populations in Baltic states.
They enforce collectivization in reoccupied territories. This work creates conflicts with local populations and rival undergrounds intensify scrutiny of their actions. Excessive violence or unauthorized actions during these operations provide grounds for arrest. Simultaneously, Moscow expands and repurposes the system of filtration camps and legal purges that will screen millions of people returning from occupied territories, partisans included.
The filtration system, originally designed for repatriated prisoners of war and forced laborers, extends to anyone who lived under occupation. The assumption is that living under German control creates potential for contamination. Everyone requires verification. Partisans despite their service fall under this system. 1944 through 1948 NKVD filtration camps and party commissions across the USSR orders establish verification and filtration camps.
A flowchart shows categories. Psuster civilians partisans. The chart indicates processing procedures for each category. Prisoners of war undergo interrogation, medical examination, and background investigation. Forced laborers face similar procedures. Civilians receive varying levels of scrutiny. Partisans theoretically receive preferential treatment, but still undergo verification.
More than 4 million people pass through NKVD filtration camps between 1944 and 1948. approximately 1.5 million PWS repatriated force laborers and civilians. The scale is enormous. Camps are established across the Soviet Union from Ukraine to Siberia. Processing capacity is overwhelmed. Thousands wait months for investigation.
By 1946, roughly 80% of civilians and 20% of Ps are freed, some remobilized into Red Army or labor battalions. Approximately 226,000 are handed over to NKVD for gulag or special settlements. Formally, partisans are privileged compared to PWS. Official directives state that partisans with verified service records should be released quickly, but many still fall under investigation because they lived in occupation, had contacts across front lines, or are accused by rivals.
Verification of partisan service is not straightforward. Partisan units often lacked proper documentation. Commanders issued handwritten certificates. NKVD liaison officers kept records, but these are incomplete. Some partisans served in units that were destroyed, leaving no organizational records.
Others served in units later deemed unreliable or infiltrated. Some are cleared quickly. Partisans with clear records, proper documentation, and vouching from party authorities pass through filtration in weeks. Others get prolonged checks. Those without documentation or whose units are under suspicion may spend months in camps while investigators verify their stories.
Investigators attempt to contact former commanders, check against NKVD files, and interview other partisans from the same unit. This process is slow and often inconclusive. Party commissions in liberated areas conduct reviews of all members in legal purges known as Chisky. The term means cleaning or purge.
Every party member in formerly occupied territory must appear before a commission and account for their behavior under occupation. Those deemed to have compromised themselves under occupation, including some partisan leaders who negotiated with local authorities or made tactical compromises are removed from positions or expelled from the party.
Expulsion means loss of privileges, employment difficulties, and social stigma. Party circulars instruct commissions to exclude from leadership anyone whose behavior during occupation raises doubts without a clear boundary between survival tactics and collaboration. The line between acceptable compromise and collaboration is vague and applied inconsistently.
A partisan commander who negotiated truses with local German garrisons to avoid civilian casualties might be praised or condemned depending on the commission’s interpretation. Contact with occupation authorities, even for tactical purposes, creates suspicion. Regional studies show that in some obelists, most former partisans disappear from party leadership by late 1940s.
Bellarusian regional party organizations show significant turnover between 1944 and 1948. Many former partisan commanders initially appointed to leadership positions are removed during Chisky and replaced by cadres from eastern regions who did not live under occupation. This pattern repeats across formerly occupied territories. Publicly partisans remain symbols of Soviet heroism.
Victory Day celebrations feature partisan veterans. Monuments to partisan brigades are erected. Films celebrate partisan exploits. Internally, they are subject to mass procedures designed on the assumption that anyone not continuously under direct control might be unreliable. The contradiction reflects deep paranoia in Stalinist system.
Service and sacrifice do not guarantee trust. Filtration and purges reshape local elites and reduce the influence of independent wartime networks. Former partisan commanders who built strong local authority are particularly vulnerable. A commander who saved his district might enjoy genuine popular support, making him dangerous to party apparatus seeking to reimpose control.
Such individuals are removed through various mechanisms, transfer to distant regions, demotion, expulsion from party or arrest. Golag archives and memoirs later reveal that among those sent to labor camps after 1945 are not only collaborators and nationalists, but also men and women with documented partisan service. The exact numbers remain disputed.
Some estimates suggest several thousand former partisans entered Gulag in late 1940s. Others suggest higher figures. Documentation is incomplete because camp records did not systematically track prior partisan service. late 1940s through early 1950s. Golag system, Vorcuda, Kalema, and other camps across the Soviet Union. A prisoner list or camp record mentions former partisan status among the inmates.
An image of a Gulag mining site shows barracks, guard towers, and prisoners working in sub-zero temperatures. The document is dated 1948 and lists prisoners by name, sentence, and background. Several entries include notation former partisan. Between 1928 and 1953, about 14 million prisoners passed through Gulag labor camps. This figure comes from memorial society research based on declassified NKVD archives.
Millions more are in colonies and special settlements. Among them are former Red Army officers, underground activists, and some partisans. The Gulag population peaks in early 1950s at approximately 2.5 million prisoners. Examples from memoirs and research show individuals with partisan backgrounds arrested on charges such as banditry, collaboration, espionage, or nationalism.
A memoir by Alexander Sirin published in 1990s describes his arrest in 1948 despite documented partisan service in Bellarus. charged with espionage based on wartime contact with Polish underground. He received 10 years in Kyma camps. A document mentions some of them former partisans captured whilst fighting, now in a Vorcuda brigade.
This phrasing appears in a camp report from 1949 describing prisoner composition. Typical charges include alleged cooperation with occupation authorities, conflicts with party officials, participation in non-siet undergrounds, or inclusion in broader campaigns against antis-siet elements in western regions.
The charge of cooperation with occupation authorities could mean anything from attending a Germanmandated meeting to actually collaborating. Conflicts with party officials, criticizing decisions, questioning authority become evidence of antis-siet attitudes. Participation in non-S Soviet undergrounds refers primarily to Baltic and Ukrainian cases where former Soviet partisans had contact with nationalist movements.
Some arrests result from campaigns against specific groups. In Baltic republics, campaigns against bourgeoa nationalists lead to mass arrests of anyone with wartime underground connections. Former Soviet partisans in Baltic states sometimes had tactical alliances with nationalist partisans against Germans. These contacts become evidence of nationalism.
In Western Ukraine, campaigns against UPA supporters catch some former Soviet partisans in the net. Guilt by association dominates. Not all partisans are repressed. Some, such as Podor Masherov, rise to high leadership positions in Soviet republics. Masherov, former commander of a partisan brigade in Bellarus, becomes first secretary of Bellarusian Communist Party in 1965.
He rules Bellarus until his death in a suspicious car accident in 1980. Other former partisans become generals, ministers, or party officials. Both paths, promotion, and repression exist side by side. The determining factors include luck, connections, political skill, and the specific circumstances of wartime service. Timing matters.
Those who integrate quickly into Red Army or party structures during 1944 through 46 generally avoid major problems. Those who remain in reserve, return to civilian life, or serve in contested western regions face higher risk. Geography matters. Former partisans from central Bellarus generally fare better than those from Western Ukraine or Baltic states. Rank matters.
Ordinary fighters are less scrutinized than commanders. Connections matter. Partisans with family in party apparatus or red army have protection. Gulog related scholarship describes the wartime and postwar battle against internal enemies continuing through the late 1940s with gulag used as a central instrument.
And Applebomb’s gulag, a history documents how postwar years see new waves of prisoners, including repatriated PWS, survivors of occupation, and various suspect categories. Stalinist security logic makes any independently organized armed group suspect. This logic extends beyond partisans to include returning soldiers, foreign war brides, anyone with extended foreign contact.
Former partisans precisely because they operated autonomously and enjoyed local authority are seen as needing either integration and strict control or removal. The system cannot tolerate potential alternative power structures. In this worldview, anyone who wielded authority outside direct party control during the war might become a focus of opposition during peace.
Better to eliminate potential threats preemptively than risk challenges to party monopoly. By the early 1950s, some former guerrillas occupy ministerial offices and party leadership posts. Others are anonymous entries in camp registers, two outcomes of the same people’s war. The contradiction is not accidental. It reflects deliberate policy.
The state rewards those who submit fully to control while eliminating those who show independence. Partisan service is not protection. It is background requiring verification. Heroism does not guarantee trust. It creates obligation that can never be fully discharged. Post 1945 assessments. Moscow Minsk military history institutes.
Two tables projected side by side. Soviet official partisan statistics versus a modern historian’s reconstruction. The left table shows Soviet figures. 20,300 trains derailed, 4,200 armored vehicles destroyed, more than 1 million enemies and accompllices killed. The right table shows revised estimates. Approximately 10,000 confirmed train attacks, roughly 1,000 armored vehicles disabled, approximately 35,000 German military personnel killed.
Official wartime and postwar statistics reiterate key Soviet claims, hundreds of thousands of rails destroyed, more than 20,000 trains damaged or derailed, over 4,000 armored vehicles disabled, thousands of bridges and depots attacked. These figures appear in Soviet military encyclopedias. official histories and commemorative publications.
They are repeated so consistently that they become accepted fact within Soviet historioggraphy. Emphasis falls on quantitative achievements, numbers of attacks, tonnage destroyed, enemy killed. These metrics demonstrate partisan effectiveness and justify resource investment. Modern reassessment summarizes scholarly consensus that many Soviet numbers are inflated, but the qualitative impact is nonetheless important.
Western historians examining German archives conclude that Soviet statistics exaggerate by factors of two to three. Russian historians accessing previously closed Soviet archives acknowledge problems with wartime reporting. Key accepted points include significant diversion of German forces, major strain on repair and transport systems, and real tactical assistance to operations like bagration.
Even skeptical historians acknowledge that partisans complicated German operations. A post-war Soviet military study calls the Bellarusian partisan movement the fourth front in the liberation of the republic. This assessment prepared by general staff analysts evaluates partisan contributions to bagration. The study concludes that partisan operations materially assisted Red Army advances by disrupting German communications and preventing orderly withdrawal.
The fourth front metaphor captures the scale and coordination of partisan operations during summer 1944. Modern historians prefer metrics such as proportion of German forces tied up in security roles, delays in rail transport, and non-availability of units at critical fronts. These metrics are less subject to inflation and better capture operational impact.
German military personnel engaged in rear security represent divisions not available for frontline combat. This opportunity cost is measurable and significant. Railway delays are documented in German transport records showing declining efficiency over time. Non-availability of units at critical moments during bag ration during Lav Sandameir’s operation appears in German operational documents.
Partisan warfare is placed as a crucial secondary factor enhancing regular Soviet offensive power. The primary factor in Soviet victory remains the Red Army. Its manpower, industrial support, operational skill, and willingness to accept casualties. Partisans amplify Red Army effectiveness but cannot substitute for it.
In areas where Red Army pressure is weak, partisan operations achieve limited results. Where Red Army offensives create crisis for Germans, partisan operations deepen that crisis by attacking vulnerable rear areas. Even corrected for propaganda, the partisan movement demonstrabably increased German losses, reduced effective transport capacity, and undermined rear area stability.
German documents confirm these effects. After action reports from Army Group Center describe constant difficulties with rear security, railway efficiency statistics show measurable decline. Security force commanders request additional troops repeatedly. These German sources validate partisan impact even while Soviet statistics exaggerate specifics.
The same system that proudly counted derailed trains and enemy casualties in wartime statistics would after victory begin counting unreliable elements in party purge infiltration reports. Two ledgers describing different phases of the same conflict. The transition from celebrating partisan heroes to investigating their reliability illustrates contradictions within Stalinist system.
Wartime expediency allows autonomous armed groups. Peacetime security requires eliminating them. The statistics that measured success in war become tools for identifying potential threats in peace. 1953 through present Soviet Union and postsviet states monument to partisans in Minsk and the Kton memorial contrasted with a declassified NKVD or party document from the late 1940s.
The monument erected in 1969 shows three partisan figures, man, woman, and youth striding forward determinately. The Ken memorial built in 1969 commemorates the village destroyed by Germans with assistance from collaborators. These memorials dominate Bellarusian memory landscape. The NKVD document declassified in 1991 lists former partisans arrested for various offenses in Minsk oblast Kruev and Brev.
Partisan veterans become central to victory day rituals and regional identity. Kruev’s desalinization after 1956 allows partial rehabilitation of repressed groups. Many arrested partisans are released from camps and restored to party membership. Brev’s rule emphasizes great patriotic war as central Soviet myth. Victory Day becomes major holiday.
Partisan veterans receive prominent roles in celebrations. Major monuments, museums, and films solidify a heroic unified narrative of the forest war. Films such as 28 panfilivites, the ascent and come and see depict partisan warfare with varying degrees of realism. Come and see directed by Ellen Kleov in 1985 shows brutal realities of occupation and partisan life.
The film acknowledges moral complexity and civilian suffering. However, official narratives emphasize heroism and unity. Many archival materials relating to filtration, purges, and repression of former partisans remain classified until the late 1980s. The gap between public narrative and archival reality widens. Citizens know the heroic version.
Historians aware of archival materials cannot publish contradictory information. Postsviet research allows historians to publish studies on filtration camps, legal purges, and gulag experiences. Glassnost and subsequent Soviet collapse open archives. Memorial Society, founded in 1988, researches political repression.
Historians access NKVD files, party documents, and Gulag records. Research reveals extent of postwar repression. The figure of the partisan is reassessed in light of both military achievements and postwar repression. This reassessment occurs gradually. Initial publications in late 1980s and early 1990s shock public opinion.
A late Soviet phrase describes partisans as the people’s avengers who brought the war to the enemy rear. This phrasing appears in official histories, textbooks, and commemorative speeches. It emphasizes popular participation and just revenge against fascist invaders. Later scholarly language speaks of victims of Stalinist repressions.
This shift reflects changing understanding. Posts Soviet historians emphasized that serving the state provided no protection against that same state’s repressions. Stalin’s fear of autonomous armed networks shaped postwar policy toward partisans. This interpretation emerges from archival research. Documents show consistent pattern of suspicion toward anyone operating outside direct control.
They were needed in war but mistrusted in peace. Wartime necessity forced Stalin to accept partisan formations. Postwar security required eliminating potential alternative power centers. Dual legacy emerges. Strategic contribution to victory and a record of selective repression against some of those very contributors.
Final juaposition. Wartime statistics of rails destroyed and trains derailed versus postwar statistics of millions processed through filtration camps with an unknown but real share being former partisans. Precise numbers of former partisans imprisoned remain unknown. Golag records do not systematically track prior service.
Estimates range from several thousand to tens of thousands. The Soviet partisan movement demonstrates both the capacity of a population to wage effective irregular war and the limits placed on independent heroism within a highly centralized repressive system. The documentary closes on the Minsk partisan monument. Names are engraved on surrounding walls.
Some belong to men who died fighting Germans in forests. Others belong to men who survived the war only to vanish into the Gulag system years later. Two fates intersect. One monument contains both. One history encompasses heroism and repression. The partisan war demonstrated effective irregular warfare while revealing the totalitarian state’s inability to tolerate autonomous power.
What is your perspective on this part of history?
