In 1965, tens of thousands of US troops are heading for war in Vietnam. Backed up by B-52 bombers, helicopters and napalm, many expect the Viet Cong guerillas to crumble in the face of unstoppable US firepower. Instead, in the jungles and swamps of Vietnam, the Americans discover combat is an exhausting slog in which casualties are high and they rarely get to fire first.
In summer 1965, 50,000 US troops arrived in South Vietnam as part of Military Assistance Command Vietnam, MACV. The USA hopes American troops and airpower will be enough to compel North Vietnam to abandon its support of the Viet Cong insurgency working to undermine the South Vietnamese government. Still, the US approach will be gradual and mostly from the air.
By late 1964, the US has already been secretly bombing North Vietnamese supply lines in neighbouring Laos, and in 1965 North Vietnam is hit as part of Operation Rolling Thunder. Still, the US mostly hits secondary targets – not Hanoi – in order to force North Vietnam to negotiate an agreement beneficial to the South.
In this sense, US President Lyndon B Johnson is not aiming for traditional territorial or total victory, but the prevention of a North Vietnamese victory over his allies in the South. North Vietnam claims no negotiations can take place while foreign troops remain in South Vietnam. And so, it seems combat, not compromise, will be the status quo in Vietnam.
US General WIlliam Westmoreland needs to develop a strategy to push the North out of South Vietnam at a low cost for the US – politically and militarily. This is a challenge, since political considerations mean his ground war must be confined almost entirely to South Vietnam. Johnson rules out any kind of conventional invasion of North Vietnam as it will likely provoke Chinese intervention, as it did during the Korean War.
The President also cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and Cambodia since he wants to limit ground operations. This, though, will make it harder for Westmoreland to isolate the battlefield. The American debate settles on two possible strategies in South Vietnam: conventional combat operations, or counterinsurgency focused on small unit operations and the political pacification of the South Vietnamese public.
Although the counterinsurgency approach has its supporters, Westmoreland believes it requires more troops and gives the Viet Cong the initiative. Instead, he hopes to make use of the US advantages in mobility and firepower in a strategy of annihilation. He plans to take the fight to the Viet Cong, eliminate them in large unit set piece battles, and cause such heavy casualties North Vietnam cannot maintain the insurgency. It’s a rapid attritional strategy.
To achieve their goals, US troops will not need to hold ground, but will carry out “search and destroy” operations at will. “… This is going to be a methodical search, house by house, village by village, as we move north… This small group of huts here houses some of the Vietnamese families.
We’re looking mostly today for military age men that may possibly be VC. So far all we can see are women and children and old men…” It’s a plan with an institutional shift in the Department of Defense. Under Secretary Robert McNamara, the DoD adopts new statistical and quantitative management methods borrowed from the world of business.
Everything about the war is quantified to assess progress and identify when North Vietnam reaches the critical “tipping point” when it can no longer sustain the struggle. Analysts and officers count everything from bomb tonnage to tent pegs, but the most important metric is the ‘body count’ of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong killed in US operations. Since the US won’t judge progress by territory captured in the same way as many traditional wars, the body count will form the basis for analysing success.
The Pentagon therefore encourages US commanders to aim for higher kill and capture counts as a means of realising Westmoreland’s strategy. The American kill count strategy expands the original passive protective role of the US troops, since now, they are to go on offensive patrols and take the fight to the Viet Cong. And they’ll be doing it with new firepower.
In an ideal search and destroy operation US troops identify a Viet Cong formation via intelligence and reconnaissance and then quickly insert ground troops to pin the enemy down. As the battle intensifies and draws in more enemy, the US troops call-in airstrikes and artillery to decisively eliminate them.
Similar operations had previously been carried out by ARVN, but American commanders felt they failed because the South Vietnamese troops’ lack of fighting quality, as opposed to a problem with the actual tactics. To support their efforts, US forces receive new tools, vehicles and weapons. From 1964, US army troops receive the 5.56mm M16 rifle to replace the 7.62mm M14.
The change will not always prove popular, but the US military claims the M16 is lighter, more controllable in automatic and can be carried with more ammunition – all important features in jungle combat where ranges are shorter and resupply harder. Coupled with the M60 machine gun and M79 “Thumper” grenade launchers, US platoons expect to bring heavy firepower against the more lightly armed Viet Cong.
Perhaps the most important asset in a platoon is the radio, which can call in support from fire bases or aircraft. With much of South Vietnam consisting of jungle-covered highlands or swampy deltas, ground transport is slow to impossible. Instead, a brown water navy of patrol boats and hovercrafts navigate the rivers, while a new generation of American military helicopters provide unprecedented mobility.
In particular, the UH-1 Iroquois – or Huey – replaces the cumbersome Shawnee to become the iconic vehicle of the Vietnam War. Used for troop insertions, extractions, medical evacuations, resupply and fire support, around a third of the 36 million helicopter sorties flown during the war are made by Hueys.
US jet aircraft, such as the F-4 Phantom and A-4 Skyhawk, also arrive to provide rapid close air support, including with napalm and white phosphorous, while the multi-minigun equipped AC-47 ‘Spooky’ gunship can provide overhead cover for hours at a time. US helicopters have an early impact on combat. During the Battle of Ia Drang in November 1965, air assault troops inflict heavy casualties on North Vietnamese regulars entering from Cambodia.
Although the NVA launch some close-range assaults at landing zones, US firepower pushes them back, including the first tactical use of B-52 bombers. Although most of the NVA escapes, the US 1st Air Cavalry Division claim a 10:1 kill ratio, seemingly confirming air assault tactics and Westmoreland’s strategy.
At first, the helicopters also have a psychological impact on North Vietnamese troops, as North Vietnamese soldier Nguyen Quang Sang remembers: “…when helicopters spotted us, we had to run for our lives. It was terrifying… Once, when a helicopter dropped down especially close… I even saw the face of the door gunner.
That was the first time I ever saw an American. I’m still haunted by it in my nightmares.” (Appy Patriots 216) By the end of 1965, the US can claim to have prevented a South Vietnamese collapse and taken the fight to the enemy. But the Viet Cong also adapt, and fight back. The mauling at Ia Drang encourages the North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong to turn back to guerilla tactics.
This is partly due to practical considerations, but also a nuanced understanding of the US political situation. North Vietnamese General Secretary Le Duan recognises US strength in Vietnam is undermined by a lack of political and public will back home: “[We] can fight a protracted war, while the US can’t… although the US can immediately send 300,000 to 400,00 troops at once, why must the US do it step by step?…
Because of fear of protracted war, and even stronger opposition of the American people and the world’s people…” (Ruane 110) Instead, the Viet Cong will take the lead in the south and employ strategies which had worked against ARVN. In 1963 US General Frank Osmanski summarized on Viet Cong tactics: “VC non-explosive weapons include caltrops, spike-traps, poisoned darts, and even enraged water buffaloes.
In a sense their physical endurance, patience, and ingenuity are also VC weapons, for they have been known to live in dark tunnels for weeks, to remain underwater for long periods by breathing through hollow reeds, and to lie in ambush for as long as 48 hours.” (Langer 75) Sniping, mines and booby traps become the principle means of Viet Cong attack.
They prioritize mines since they maim just as often as they kill, draining US resources and morale. The Viet Cong also become experts at launching well-planned ambushes, often targeting officers and radiomen to prevent air support being called in. Most attacks are over in minutes. These tactics are aided by simplified logistics.
A Viet Cong soldier carries as less as five kilograms of equipment in combat, compared to up to 40 for a US soldier. The North Vietnamese can also draw on local supplies from friendly or coerced villagers. Additionally, they can blend into the local civilian population and call on irregular supporters who can perform labour, set mines, or collect unexploded US ordnance for repurposing.
Vast networks of tunnels, some even under US bases, allow for the VC to infiltrate and protect their personnel and equipment from US firepower. Parallel to the Viet Cong is the regular People’s Army of Vietnam, also known as the North Vietnamese Army, or NVA. Thanks to political regimentation, propaganda and conscription, the NVA quickly expands with new Soviet and Chinese equipment.
Soon NVA units can claim to match US squad firepower with weapons like the AK-47 automatic rifle, RPD machinegun, and rocket propelled grenades. The Viet Cong are sometimes armed with WWII-era weapons, but also receive newer equipment via the Ho Chi Minh trail. The Soviet Union and China also provide protection against bombing, including engineering troops, anti-aircraft systems and fighter jets, such as MiG-21s.
North Vietnamese fighter ace Luu Huy Chao recalls one advantage he had over US pilots: “Once I had shot down an F-4, I was no longer scared of any type of American aircraft. The psychological factor is very important in any battle… part of my confidence came from knowing that if I had to bail out I would be landing in my own country.
” (Appy Patriots 214) The North Vietnamese approach is to attack only when the situation favours them. As a result, they often neutralise US technological advantages through patience and surprise. In fact, although helicopters dominate the news, the reality of combat in Vietnam is decidedly low tech. One reason for this is that helicopters are expensive and valuable targets for the Viet Cong.
Once familiar with helicopters, the North Vietnamese become skilled at shooting them down or targeting them at vulnerable moments. Their loud rotors make surprise almost impossible, allowing for ambushes at landing zones with RPGs or heavy machine guns: “When the troops leaped from the lead choppers, the entire tree line erupted with small arms f
ire… A machine gun opened up from the hillside north of the LZ, pouring lethal fire into the helicopters… The rounds went smashing into the plexiglass cockpits… One bird rolled over like a great wounded bull elephant, the rotor blades still whirring as they chopped into the earth…” (Langer 126) The US loses around 5,000 helicopters during the war, about half to enemy action.
To reduce the risk, helicopters drop off US troops at more secure locations for long, sometimes multi-week patrols in the jungle – known to the GIs as “humping the boonies”. In these conditions, the Viet Cong are only one adversary for the Americans. Wildlife, mosquitos, disease, exhaustion and dehydration affect US troops too.
With only one percent of patrols experiencing enemy contact, mines and booby traps are perhaps the biggest concern. They account for about a quarter of all casualties, as one 19 year old US soldier reports: “It’s an absurd combination of certainly and uncertainty: the certainty that you’re walking in mine fields, walking past things day after day; the uncertainty of your every movement, of which way to shift your weight, of where to sit down.
” (Appy WCW 171) When there is contact, the Viet Cong almost always trigger the engagement with a 1966 report suggesting the North Vietnamese initiate around 79 percent of attacks. They also become skilled at predicting air support response times and withdrawing before it arrives, or attacking so close that air support threatens US troops as well. By 1968, around 15 to 20 percent of US casualties are from friendly fire.
“As you come into the village you always get this sniper fire, never fails. And, we invariably take casualties once in a while. We return fire, and by the time we get to the villages, these VC are gone, and it makes it very difficult and very frustrating for us.” US weapons also struggle in the jungle environment, especially the M16 rifle.
A US study records 10.5 malfunctions per 1,000 rounds fired in 1965. Overall, the M16’s lightweight materials were sensitive to variations in propellant and poor lubrication – and many US soldiers who arrive early on had no prior training with the M16 before arriving in Vietnam. Eventually the Pentagon introduces modifications, like rust resistant components, along with better maintenance training. By 1968 the M16’s malfunction rate declines to around 3.
8 malfunctions per 1,000 rounds, with the most serious ejection failures reduced to 0.32. Still, its early reputation persists, especially amongst Marines. The M60 machine-gun also has its supporters and detractors. When functioning, troops value its versatility and morale-building firepower – including when mounted on helicopters.
But others note its reliability quickly declines through wear and tear, with few replacement parts available. Its high rate of fire also requires riflemen to carry heavy 7.62 ammunition and barrels. Overall, this mixture of combat stress, physical exhaustion, danger and inability to fight back creates frustration among US soldiers: “You go out on patrol maybe twenty times or more, and nothin’, just nothin’.
Then, the twenty-first time, zap, zap, zap, you get hit and Victor Charlie fades into the jungle before you can close with him.” (Lawrence TVW 107) US troops in Vietnam are also under many additional stresses. Around a quarter are draftees – essentially conscripts – and their average age is only 19. Few of the American newcomers transfer to Vietnam as complete units, but instead arrive as individuals or in small groups.
High officer turnover and the fact few experienced troops stay beyond their contracted tour of duty means combat experience is not retained and must be relearned. The stresses of combat, an elusive enemy, and peer pressure might partly explain – though not excuse – how cases of American violence against Vietnamese civilians become widespread. As the war continues, civilians suffer increasing violence, injury and property destruction, both intentional and accidental, at the hands of US, ARVN and allied troops.
Hostility – or at least ambivalence – from locals leads some US GIs to conclude villagers support the Viet Cong. In many cases, this is true – even a South Vietnamese government report estimates 5 million of the 17 million residents of South Vietnam support the insurgency. This realisation undermines US soldiers’ belief in the war, and promotes indifference to the plight of locals.
Marine officer Phillip Caputo is one who lost hope: “…When we marched into the rice paddies… we carried, along with our packs and rifles, the implicit convictions that… we were doing something altogether noble and good. We kept the packs and rifles; the convictions, we lost.” (Caputo) US reprisals against locals may result from anger at casualties, but also frustration at their inability to hit back at the VC.
The State Department’s Daniel Ellsberg joins a patrol in 1967 which destroys a civilian home: “Their desire to burn the house was in part the result of frustration and in part reflected the fact that they honestly didn’t know what might work.” (Appy 193) South Vietnamese civilians also experience violence from the Viet Cong.
The escalation of the war in 1965 weakens support for the VC, so they resort to more coercion and political pressure to get recruits, supplies, and intelligence. Civilian contact with US or ARVN troops also results in political accusations and denunciations. Le Ly Hayslip, a South Vietnamese villager, is attacked by the Viet C
ong when her loyalty was doubted. She concludes: “After a while, our fear of the Viet Cong… was almost as strong as our fear of the republicans. If the republicans were like elephants trampling our village, the Viet Cong were like snakes who came at us in the night. At least you can see an elephant coming and get out of the way.” (Langer 198/109) The psychological impact and tactical reality on the ground mean that by 1967 the war is a stalemate.
When US troops engage the enemy on their terms, they cause high casualties, but the nature of the fighting is taking its toll. North Vietnam is also carrying out a strategy of attrition, and arguably more successfully. But Westmoreland doesn’t think North Vietnam is winning – in public at least, he emphasizes progress. By 1967 there are 485,600 US troops in Vietnam, although Westmoreland wants even more.
Large scale search and destroy operations in early 1967 seem to confirm Westmoreland’s opinions. The US claims it kills 2,000 enemy insurgents in Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City, while Westmoreland states there were fewer than 242,000 Viet Cong fighters left in the country. The reality is not so clear cut. MACV’s figures are almost entirely wrong.
By establishing body counts as the metric for success, US commanders inflate the figures – sometimes by double. Officers eager to show progress or ability post high estimates, or count civilian dead as Viet Cong according to a blunt unspoken rule: “if it’s dead and Vietnamese, it’s VC.
” The focus on quantifiable data means concepts that aren’t easily quantified, like morale, ideological support and opinions of locals, are sidelined, in a “if it can’t be counted, it can’t be important” mentality. But this attitude ignores vital elements of warfare, especially counterinsurgency operations, and applies clumsy numerical values to complex socio-political issues.
The US approach is also based on their estimations of North Vietnamese limits and capabilities. MACV consistently underestimates how North Vietnam can sustain high losses through its conceptualisation of the conflict as a total people’s war of revolutionary unification. The CIA, who are critical of the statistical methods, report as many as 600,000 enemy in South Vietnam in 1967 with 200,000 North Vietnamese entering draft age each year.
Additionally, US bombing has not brought victory. Although Rolling Thunder destroys 59 percent of power stations and 75 percent of oil storage in North Vietnam, this has little impact on a majority agrarian society and unmechanised military. Bombing is also expensive and dangerous. More sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons mean for every dollar of damage caused by bombing in 1967, the US pays $9.50.
Instead, US bombing and pursuit of the body count is having a negative impact elsewhere. Americans are less likely to support the war and international opinion is also turning against the US. In Sweden, India, and Japan, many people are publicly lauding the North Vietnamese for their resistance.
In late 1967, Westmoreland and Johnson embark on a public relations tour of the US to convince the people of their successes in Vietnam. Westmoreland tells the public: “The ranks of the Viet Cong are thinning… The end begins to come into view.” (Appy WCW 166) The first months of 1968 will prove him disastrously wrong. SPONSORSHIP The Vietnam War is perhaps the most well-known “hot” proxy war during the Cold War when the global super powers were not battling directly out of fear of nuclear retaliation – even though they came close to direct confrontation during the Cuban Missile Crisis just a few
years before the escalation in Vietnam. And while the nuclear arsenals expanded, the Soviet Union also pursued their vision of Nuclear Powered Communism by rapidly increasing the production of nuclear reactors. Whole cities were built to accommodate a new atomic elite that would help produce limitless energy.
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