Vietnam War: Battle of Dong Xoai – Rare Footage of Ambush That Erased a Battalion | War Documentary

Heat. Heat. By mid 19560, as the US and Saigon government’s special war strategy was still in operation, signs of instability had begun to emerge. The Binfurk area, where routes from the Cambodian border flowed down toward the lowlands, was becoming a critical junction. Here, Donguai was neither a major urban center nor a key fortified base, but it lay directly along the axis linking

liberation forces controlled zones with the defensive belt north of Saigon. For the ARVN, holding Donguai meant preserving a vital link in their defensive chain. For the liberation forces, striking it was a way to force the enemy out of dispersed positions and expose them along their maneuver corridors.

 According to intelligence reports at the time, liberation forces had begun concentrating around the area on a larger scale than usual rather than operating in small dispersed units as before. This indicated a clear shift from harassment tactics to organized deliberate assaults targeting isolated strong points.

 In response, ARVN command remained confident that with artillery, firepower, helicopter mobility, and rapid reinforcement capability, they could hold any position under attack long enough to mount a counter offensive. From these assessments, in the opening days of June 1,965, Donguai was no longer just a geographic objective.

 It became the point where two opposing modes of warfare would collide directly. a place where control was not determined by positions on a map, but by firepower, tempo, and the endurance of individual units on the ground. At approximately 23:30 on the night of the 9th of June, 1965, as the liberation forces assault elements closed in and took up positions around the defensive perimeter of Donguai, mortar fire began to pound the entire area.

 The barrage concentrated on barbed wire obstacles, command bunkers, and firing positions of the ARVN, creating a breaching curtain in the opening minutes. Under continuous flashes of explosions, assault teams from the 272nd regiment advanced, using the rubber plantation terrain to move in at close range. However, upon reaching the outer defensive line, the liberation assault elements encountered multiple layers of barbed wire and minefields laid by ARBN that had not been fully reconoided.

 Several lead teams were hit by mines or became entangled at the wire, causing the formation to stall and take casualties within the first minutes. The liberation forces were forced to halt the frontal push, quickly bringing forward engineers with satchel charges and wire cutters while adjusting mortar and recoilless rifle fire to strike just along the ARVN defensive line to open corridors.

 Within the first 15 minutes of fighting alone, the forward elements of the 272nd regiment recorded approximately 20 casualties. ARVN forces reported seven casualties, mostly from the preparatory mortar barrage. The outer defensive line of Donguai began to be penetrated at multiple points. ARVN units were compelled to fall back toward the central area, fighting while attempting to maintain communication.

Some positions became completely isolated as trench lines were cut. In the darkness, identifying the direction of the enemy’s advance became increasingly difficult. While fire from multiple directions continued to converge on their positions by 1 on June 10th, liberation forces launched a second assault on the Donguai base.

 To breach the barbed wire obstacles, assault teams resorted to direct methods. Lead soldiers threw themselves onto the wire, creating makeshift paths for the following waves to push through. Immediately afterward, they brought up close-range firepower. flamethrowers, B40 rockets, grenades, and demolition charges to destroy defensive bunkers.

Flames swept along the trench lines, forcing CIG units to fall back toward the district’s central military compound. However, despite closing in on several key positions, the liberation forces were still unable to seize the district headquarters, the command center for US and ARBN forces. During the close quarters fighting, the US ARVN command structure was hit.

 Captain Bill Stokes was severely wounded and command passed to Lieutenant Charles Q. Williams, though wounded himself. Williams organized a counterattack when a 7.62 mm machine gun from the liberation side began firing directly into the command post. Alongside CB engineer Marvin Shields, he crawled toward the position with a 35in bazooka, destroying two enemy firing points before both men were seriously wounded.

Their actions helped hold the command post at a critical moment outside the defensive perimeter. However, liberation forces continued to increase pressure. They fired an additional 200 mortar rounds into the defensive zone, then launched another large-s scale assault at 230. Under constant pressure, US and ARBN forces were forced to contract their lines and withdraw to the district assembly hall, the last remaining defensive strong point.

 There, American and CDG ARBN troops stood back to back fighting at extremely close range in the dark while their communication system was nearly paralyzed. by five. US ARVN forces managed to partially restore communications by improvising a batterypowered radio, allowing them to send a distress signal to Saigon. During this waiting period, the defenders were forced to hold their ground under sustained pressure without any direct fire support.

 Meanwhile, liberation forces maintained the encirclement, preparing for further assaults at first light, aiming to conclude the battle in the morning before any relief force could arrive. With Donguis defenses breached during the night, Major General Fam Corkthan, commander of the ARVN fifth division, approved a plan to deploy the first battalion, 7th regiment, into the area to organize a relief force.

 At approximately 5:30 on the 10th of June 1965 at Vienna Air Base, all helicopters of the 118th Aviation Company were in position for takeoff. At 9:43, the first insertion wave 166 ARBN troops accompanied by two US advisers landed in a clearing about 3 km from Dongu. As the helicopters descended, aerial observers spotted a group of several dozen individuals on the ground waving their arms, assessing them as civilians.

 No suppressive fire was called in, but the situation reversed the moment the Hueies touched down and their doors opened. These civilians immediately dispersed into pre-prepared fighting positions and opened fire at close range. Within the first minutes, the first battalion’s formation was hit directly at the landing zone.

 Around 40 soldiers were put out of action. Many struck while disembarking or while still moving out of the landing area. Some elements, unable to deploy into formation in time, were completely split apart, losing contact, and unable to reestablish a coherent line. Recognizing that the initial landing zone could not be held, US planners were forced to adjust.

 After a rapid reconnaissance, subsequent helicopter waves were redirected to the airirst strip at the Thwan Loy Plantation about 6 kilometers from Donguai. This area had previously avoided bombardment because the plantation owner, a French national, had objected to air strikes, and it was therefore assessed to still offer relatively intact landing ground.

However, at approximately 12:55, as the Hueies began to land, the situation repeated itself. This time even more dangerously. The moment the rotor blades touched down, a large mine detonated within the landing zone, followed immediately by coordinated machine gun and mortar fire. Many troops were cut down as they exited the helicopters.

 A mortar round struck one Kiwi directly, destroying the aircraft and killing all four crew members along with two US advisers on board. The remaining helicopters were forced into emergency takeoff, managing to insert only about 80 additional troops before withdrawing, their fuselages riddled with bullet impacts.

 After two insertion attempts, roughly 500 ARVN troops had been deployed across two separate landing zones, but both elements faced the same situation. Encirclement immediately upon landing. Before they could consolidate, they were forced into a defensive posture under isolation. Of the more than 500 troops inserted, over 250 were reported missing with their status unknown.

 Under the dense volume of mortar fire, machine guns, and prepositioned minefields surrounding the landing zones, US air support was compelled to suspend all further helicopter insertions. In effect, the area had become a killing zone where any attempt at reinforcement was met with immediate and severe losses the moment troops touched the ground.

 As the landing zones outside were progressively sealed off and all helicopter reinforcement efforts were forced to halt, the situation inside Donguai Town deteriorated along a single consistent trajectory, compressed, isolated, and steadily depleted. The remaining US ARVN defensive clusters were pushed deep into the camp and central fortifications.

Ammunition stocks dropped rapidly after hours of close-range fighting. Wounded personnel filled makeshift shelters while the number of effective combat troops continued to shrink. At approximately 1355, US forces attempted a direct intervention. Two helicopters from the 118th Aviation Company made a high-risk landing on a soccer field inside the compound, one of the few remaining open areas still accessible.

Liberation fire immediately converged on the landing zone. The crews had only minutes on the ground. After a brief suppressive burst, they managed to extract nine American personnel and eight ARVN soldiers. However, this limited evacuation did not alter the overall situation. Most forces remained trapped and the pressure from the encirclement quickly reasserted itself.

By 1655, ARVN committed its main counterattack force. Approximately 330 troops from the 52nd Ranger Battalion were inserted by helicopter to within roughly 45 m of enemy lines. This extremely close insertion reduced exposure time under fire and created a moment of surprise, preventing liberation defensive positions from adjusting in time.

 As a result, the Ranger Force deployed rapidly and launched an immediate assault upon landing, pushing directly into the CDG camp and retaking positions at close range. Fighting continued into the night. Liberation forces conducted repeated counterattacks, closing in, striking, and then withdrawing, quickly, forcing the Rangers to disperse in order to hold each position they had just regained.

 Although they managed to secure the CDG camp, they were unable to expand control. The encirclement in essence remained intact. Meanwhile, distress signals from Donguai continued to reach Bianoa air base. Ammunition was nearly exhausted and casualties were rising rapidly. Major Harvey Stewart organized an emergency extraction mission, leading three UH1 Hueies directly into the area.

 Under brief suppressive cover, the helicopters managed to lift out a number of survivors, including the severely wounded Lieutenant Charles Q. Williams. But as soon as they withdrew, enemy fire resumed immediately. The encirclement tightened once more, and Donguai remained far from relieved. On the morning of June 11th, after holding the camp through a night under intense pressure, ARBN Ranger forces consolidated control over the CIG compound.

 During clearing operations, patrol teams discovered two surviving US Navy CB engineers and evacuated them from the area. At the same time, ARVN continued to reinforce the battlefield, inserting an additional 470 troops from the seventh airborne battalion by helicopter to retake the town. With these reinforcements, the remaining liberation force pockets were gradually pushed back from key positions.

 By approximately 14:30, ARVN had largely regained control of Dongu. However, when returning to the previous landing zones, particularly the initial insertion site, they found around 60 ARVN soldiers and two US advisers still lying where they had fallen, their bodies yet to be recovered.

 Shortly afterward, airborne units organized the retrieval of the dead while evacuating the remaining wounded from the rubber plantation area, marking the end of the most intense phase of the battle. But the cost of that victory had not yet run its course. On June 12th, the ARVN 7th Airborne Battalion, now reduced to around 400 troops, after earlier losses, advanced toward the thwanlay plantation to search for missing elements.

 When reconnaissance patrols reported the area as quiet, the unit began to consolidate its formation. At that moment, the Liberation 271st regiment triggered a pre-planned ambush. Claymore type mines and machine guns opened fire simultaneously at close range. Taking advantage of poor weather conditions that grounded US air support, the attackers split the ARVN airborne formation into multiple small groups and destroyed them in sequence.

 Some ARVN troops attempted to withdraw toward the main road, only to encounter armored vehicles previously captured by liberation forces and were cut off again. Even a US North American F-100 Super Saber sent in for support was shot down over the area. By the night of June 12, only about 150 ARVN airborne troops along with two US advisers and several wounded managed to make it back to Donguai.

 In this single search operation alone, the force suffered heavy losses. Approximately 250 killed with more than 150 wounded or captured by liberation forces. Donguai, once thought of as a quiet rubber plantation zone, had turned into a grinding machine. The straight rows of trees became corridors of death. The 271st regiment had woven a lethal web across the terrain.

 After the ARVN 7th Airborne Battalion suffered heavy losses in the counterattacks, US command at MACV assessed that liberation forces still retained operational mobility and could continue to threaten the Donguay area. On that basis, General William West Morland decided to commit a US quick reaction force aiming to regain the initiative and prevent further expansion of enemy operations.

 The mission was assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the first US Airborne Combat Unit deployed to Vietnam. On June 13, more than 700 troops from the First Battalion, 503rd Infantry, were airlifted by helicopter into the Fukving area, not far from Donguai, where they deployed and began reconnaissance sweeps to pursue the forces that had just engaged in the battle.

 However, upon entering the area, they found no clear target. Liberation units had already withdrawn from the battlefield, taking with them most of their forces and wounded. What remained were only traces of combat, destroyed fortifications, damaged weapons, and flattened defensive positions. This outcome reflected a defining operational pattern of the liberation forces during this phase of the war.

 Not to hold ground, but to strike quickly. inflict heavy losses and withdraw before US forces could bring their firepower and mobility to bear. As a result, even rapid US deployments often arrived after the decisive phase had ended, facing a battlefield with no remaining target to engage. The entire engagement at Donguay lasted 4 and 1/2 days, but inflicted severe losses on both sides.

 US reports recorded more than 300 Liberation fighters found dead and 104 weapons captured, though actual casualties were likely higher. ARVN losses stood at 416 killed, 174 wounded, and 233 missing. US forces suffered 18 killed, mostly advisers and air crew. For the liberation side, the victory at Donguai demonstrated that heavily armed but isolated ARVN strong points could be attacked and effectively ground down through coordinated night assaults combined with interdiction of reinforcement routes.

 The operation also exposed weaknesses in the strategic hamlet system and the broader defensive network established by Saigon. for the US and ARVN. Donguai served as a warning about the limitations of static defensive systems. Only a few months later at the battle of Iadrang, the scale of US involvement expanded significantly, marking the beginning of a new phase of the war.

 From a broader perspective, Donguai represented a sharp inflection point in the course of the war in 1965. Within what appeared to be a simple rubber plantation landscape, the battle revealed the intensity of close-range combat under conditions of limited visibility and restricted maneuver. Losses cut across all unit types and levels from local forces, rangers, and airborne troops to liberation main force units.

 From Donguai onward, the character of the war began to shift toward engagements defined by short duration, close proximity, and exceptionally high attrition.