Interviews with the Main Nazi Leaders Before their Sentences | Nuremberg 1946

Trial in Jerusalem former. Hello dear friends and welcome to a new documentary. Today we delve into material that is as shocking as it is revealing. authentic interviews conducted with some of the top ranking officials of the Third Reich shortly before they were tried at the Nuremberg tribunals.
Before we begin, it is important to clarify that this video is intended solely for historical and educational purposes. It does not seek to justify or glorify those responsible for one of the darkest chapters of the 20th century, but rather to understand through their own words how those who held the highest levels of power in Nazi Germany thought and perceived themselves.
The interviews presented here were conducted in 1946 during their imprisonment and appear translated into Spanish with representative voiceovers. We begin with the interview conducted with Herman Guring, chief of the Luftvafer and Hitler’s designated successor. [Music] Mr. Guring, how are you experiencing your imprisonment and what reflections does the trial bring to you? I live like any other prisoner.
The uniform is dirty. The cell is austere, but that doesn’t bother me. I’m used to keeping my composure. I can even force a smile if needed. But I detest when they pry into personal matters like my family or my wives. That’s something I won’t discuss. The same goes for my private life. It was excellent and that’s all there is to say.
As for the trial, it’s a farce. I told the court that if they’re looking for someone to hold responsible, I’ll stand as that person. Let the others go. Funk Fritz Colton Bruner. Most of them I didn’t even know before this imprisonment. I’ve sent soldiers to their deaths. Why should I be afraid? I was Hitler’s successor and I’ve never shied away from taking responsibility for the official acts of the state.
That’s another matter entirely from the accusations of extermination with which I had nothing to do. I won’t deny that I had differences with Hitler. In the beginning, I could speak freely with him, but over time that changed. In April of 45, he ordered me to take command of the Reich, but then he revoked the decision and had the SS arrest me. Even so, I hold no grudge.
Those were his final hours. He was under immense pressure. Had I been able to speak to him face to face, everything would have been different. Did you try to prevent the war? How do you recall your role in the Reich’s strategic decisions? Yes, I tried. I sought agreements with England, even without Hitler’s knowledge.
After Munich and the annexation of Austria, I believed we had regained enough of what was lost after the Great War. But then came Czechoslovakia, which Hitler saw as a Soviet air base. I warned him that if we demanded Danzig, England would declare war on us. I also predicted the entry of the United States.
I advised him to sign a treaty with Stalin. He hesitated, but Ribbentrop convinced the Soviets through an agreement. I negotiated it myself, and regarding the invasion of the Soviet Union, I was against it. We should have first defeated England and taken Gibralar. If we had succeeded, Franco would have cooperated.
Our air force wasn’t prepared for a war in the east. But Hitler believed the campaign would be short. By 1943, I had fallen out of favor. And by 1944, he wouldn’t even speak to me. I had lost influence in decision-making. But if someone has to bear the consequences, here I am. As a leader, I accept my share. We spoke some time ago about your childhood, but you didn’t want to go into detail.
Have you given it any further thought? The truth is, I don’t think much about it. I know you’re trying to understand me psychologically, and I appreciate that. You don’t preach or pry like others. You let the other person speak, and you wait. One day, I’ll be the one asking you the questions. But yes, I have thought about what you asked me.
And I’ve come to the conclusion that there’s not much difference between the child I was and the man I became. I believe that even as a boy, the traits that would define my adult personality were already visible. I couldn’t draw, but I loved art from a young age. I was drawn to strong colors, blue, red, green, and I always detested the modern, the abstract.
Picasso disgusts me. My favorite style has always been Gothic. Perhaps because I grew up in medieval castles near Saltsburg and Nuremberg, which fortunately still stand today. Hitler and I were very different in this regard. He preferred the classical, the monumental, the Greek or Renaissance style with lots of columns.
He liked 19th century painters and admired Rembrandt. He couldn’t stand Durer who is one of my favorites. I, on the other hand, preferred the German masters, the Nordic ones like Holine. We also differed in materials. He preferred bronze and stone. I preferred wood. Even in art, our difference in origin was evident.
He was from the south, I from the north. That shaped everything. Regarding my parents, it was always said that I inherited my father’s mind and my mother’s temperament. He was from the north and she from the south. Northern Germany is more calm and structured, the south more artistic. All the great statesmen came from the north, the artists from the south.
My father was a resident minister and formerly a colonial governor in Africa. Unlike my siblings, I was born in Germany. He died when I was 20. I was already an officer and had been away from home for years. He was strict, but his subordinates respected him. He had a vital strategic mind. My mother passed away 10 years later at the age of 64.
I felt closer to my father. She was a good mother, but by then I had already left home and we lost contact. She was his second wife. The first was from Western Germany. In his final years, my father never followed his diabetic diet. He drank wine and ate whatever he wanted until the end. That was his way of living. Mr.
Guring, in your opinion, why was there such strong resentment toward the Jews in Germany? Well, I suppose it was because of their influence. In Berlin, before we came to power, the Jews practically controlled all the theaters and cinemas. In smaller towns, their presence was less noticeable, but in the major cities, it was evident.
Germany had a very rich theatrical life. We had 74 permanent opera companies and more than 260 stable theater companies. In the United States, maybe they have two permanent operas. In every German city, there was a state theater, an opera house, an opereta, and a playhouse. Nuremberg, for example, had a large opera house, and just 5 km away in FTH, another one.
In Broy and Ansbach, the same. All that cultural development flourished between 1900 and 1930 until Striker, that pig, became the district party administrator in Franconia and ruined everything. If Shiraak had been in charge instead, history would have been different. Mr. Guring, during Balddorf on Shiraak’s defense, you requested to be excused from the court.
Could you explain why? Yes. I claimed pain in my leg, a sciatica, which was true, although not that severe. The truth is, I didn’t want to witness the spectacle Shurak was about to put on. I knew exactly what he was going to say. I preferred not to be there because I believe he is making a serious mistake. He wants to show the world that he has changed, that he now sympathizes with the Jews, and that he was deceived by Hitler.
But that is false. He is no different now than he was then. He played his own role in the persecution of the Jews and now he pretends to have been just another victim. I don’t respect that attitude. At first he tried to maintain a common stance with the other accused. But when he saw that he couldn’t succeed, he started to distance himself.
Instead of accepting his share of responsibility like we did, he chose to point to Hitler and dissociate himself as if he had never been involved in what happened. I thought it was better to avoid that performance and honestly I do not regret having done so at you recently mentioned that Geron Runstead came to testify.
What is your opinion of him and the so-called Arden offensive? Yes, I heard that he was here and that now he claims to be anti-Nazi, saying the offensive was Hitler’s madness and that he opposed any advance. But the truth is that the offensive was the Furer’s idea and it was a brilliant plan.
The problem was the execution, especially by Dietrich and his sixth Panzer army, who were not qualified for the task. Dietrich should never have been an army commander. The operation was poorly executed, but its conception was the work of a genius. Hitler also designed the plans for Poland, France, and Russia. All brilliant in their design, although once again we failed in execution.
If his original plan had been followed, the Russian campaign could have concluded successfully in 1941. But now all the generals present themselves as smarter than Hitler. When he was in command, they followed him without question and were even glad to receive his instructions. Bach, for example, was supposed to encircle the northern and southern armies in Russia, but preferred to advance on Moscow, which led to failure.
Then, of course, they blamed the Furer for not winning the war. It’s easy to do from here, but back then no one dared to oppose him. Mr. Guring, you have firmly defended Hitler’s leadership during the trial. But how would you describe the man behind the leader? What do you think would have happened if Germany had won the war? To understand Hitler, you have to distinguish between two stages.
The first up until the victory in France was a charismatic, kind, and straightforward man. He had an iron will and an absolutely exceptional ability to influence others. The second Hitler, the one who emerged with the Russian campaign, was at very different, distrustful, tense, always on edge.
His character hardened, his nerves were shattered, his left hand trembled, and it was obvious he was struggling to stay steady. But even in that state, his willpower was impressive. And don’t forget this, if he hadn’t lost the war, if he hadn’t had to face England, the United States, and Russia simultaneously, powers which one by one he could have defeated.
Today, many of those who criticize him would be raising their arms and saying, “Hile Hitler.” Regarding the world after victory, Hitler didn’t want as much as is said. From France, he only intended to recover also German provinces. He never coveted the British Empire. In Russia, his goal was to destroy that Soviet monster and replace it with a federal system.
He might have claimed some territories in the Baltic states, but nothing more. He had no interest in South America. And in Africa, the only thing he cared about were the former German colonies. Hitler was not a man of colonial empires. He was a continental man. His vision was a European Union under German leadership.
something very much like I would say what the United States is now trying to do in a different way. A cohesive Europe in collaboration with Germany as the axis. At what point did you realize the war was lost? Do you believe the generals betrayed Hitler? Many believe everything went wrong in Normandy, but that’s not true.
Until the Ardan’s offensive, the situation was still manageable. That’s where the real problems began. Marshall vonflug, for example, did not fulfill his duty. He could have closed his tanks and held the front, but he didn’t and had to retreat. Then he committed suicide. Why didn’t he act? It’s not clear yet, but all indications are that he tried to contact high-ranking British officers and betray Hitler.
It’s just another example of generals who switched sides when things got tough. And then when the outcome was obvious, everyone became smarter than Hitler. Everyone declared themselves opponents. But while we were winning, no one questioned him. If the outcome had been different, none of these accused would have had a critical word to say.
I assure you of that, Mr. Guring. What was your knowledge of and position on the atrocities committed, especially in the concentration camps and against the Jews? We are talking about a topic I detest, but it is unavoidable when mentioning Hitler. I am convinced that he did not know the details. Himmler acted as if he could do whatever he wanted without consequences.
Hitler at first was not a cruel man. That change happened in the last years, especially in the final one when human life lost value for him. In contrast, I was always strict with serious crimes such as treason or rape, but in other cases, I granted many pardons. I never approved the death penalty for women. What is said today about the camps is incomprehensible to me.
Regarding Ashvitz, for example, I knew nothing. H said at the tribunal that everything was kept secret and I believe him. Those numbers are impossible to imagine. I do not deny that terrible things happened, but the magnitude is inconceivable to me. I heard rumors, but I attributed them to enemy propaganda. I asked at the time, and I was told the same thing.
They were lies. We knew there were quick executions in camps, yes, but never that innocents were being killed on mass. The name Ikeman, for example, I heard for the first time here. The evacuation of the Jews was planned first from the Reich, then to the general government in Poland. The idea was that after the war, they would be resettled in Palestine or elsewhere.
That was planned beforehand, like many other measures for the future, even in economic matters. I take full responsibility for what happened under national socialism, but not for what I never knew. And yes, I admit I was the first to authorize concentration camps in 1933 for communists and declared enemies of the regime, but never with the intention to kill or exterminate. That was not their purpose.
And what was your opinion about the Jews? Did you believe like others in the regime that they were a threat? By 1938 or 1939, it was no longer a question of whether Jews were desirable or not. The difference between Jews and Germans was so marked that it became clear they could not coexist in Germany. But this was not a systematic plan from the beginning.
In 1933, Hitler only demanded their removal from public office, nothing more. If it hadn’t been for pressure from the party and agitators like Gerbles, perhaps it would have ended there. But that pressure grew and the situation escalated. The November 1938 crisis, Cristalln, destroyed the entire Jewish economic base.
From then on, either they were reintegrated into economic life or something would happen and the latter is what occurred. Many tried to immigrate on their own. They knew they had no future. It was not a decision made overnight but a rapid evolution driven by extremism. It was also a disaster for our international relations. In my opinion, the worst thing Gobles did.
He was a fanatic and unleashed a situation that deeply damaged the country. Mr. Guring, you have spoken about your relationship with Ysef Gerbles. What can you tell us about him, his influence over Hitler, and his role in the regime’s anti-semitic policy? Gerbles was a fanatic, the worst kind of opportunist one can imagine.
He had an excessive personal ambition and used anti-semitism as a tool to climb the ranks of power. I’m not sure he personally hated the Jews. He simply found an effective way to strengthen himself by using the press and anti-Semitic propaganda. He was a man without scruples, cunning, and very dangerous. You couldn’t reason with him.
Striker, by comparison, seemed harmless, half crazy, and clumsy. But Gerbles was different. He forced women to sleep with him, taking advantage of his position. and once Hitler even slapped him over an issue with an actress. Still, he ended up earning Hitler’s trust. Hitler used to visit my house for coffee and leave early, but with Gerbles, he would spend the nights until 4 in the morning.
What kind of influence did he have over him during those hours? God only knows. Gerbles had more influence in turning Hitler toward radical anti-semitism than is commonly said. He even directly accused me of protecting the Jews. After that, Hitler ordered me to implement certain measures and that became the basis of the speech for which I was attacked at the tribunal.
That speech was delivered before only six or seven ministers under pressure. What was cited in court were only the damaging fragments, not the parts where I clearly said that no one should be left to starve, not even the Jews. Those phrases were never read. At that time, maintaining an anti-semitic attitude was a direct order, and while I blame Gerbles for much of the excesses, the responsibility was not solely on the party.
Before 1933, there were provocations as well. I myself was the target of insults and slanders from the Jewish press. I do not justify what happened, but it was a struggle that escalated in that environment. Our responses also became harsher. What I want to make clear is that I never wish to exterminate anyone.
That is not my nature. Yes, I can justify reprisals if they are motivated, but never the mass murder of innocents. that simply cannot be defended. Do you then consider that you were not responsible for the atrocities committed, nor did you share the more extreme motivations of the regime? That’s right. I’m accused of taking the atrocities lightly because they saw me smile or make some gesture in court, but that’s a misunderstanding.
I’m someone who by nature tends to maintain composure in difficult situations, even with a smile. It doesn’t mean I find it amusing. To me, the crimes judged here are the most atrocious part of all this. Himmler, for example, was directly responsible. He should have faced this tribunal instead of committing suicide.
Unlike Hitler, whose decision to take his life I can understand in its context, Himmler left others like Colton Bruner to carry the burden of his crimes. I never understood how Himmler came to have such influence over Hitler. He was a good organizer, yes, but not someone with charisma. He was an enigmatic figure, even to me.
In his secret speeches like those in Posen, his true nature is revealed. Everything he did, he did without saying much but with lethal results. As for anti-semitism, I repeat, it was not about extermination but about evacuation. The idea was to relocate the Jews to the general government in Poland.
and later once the war was over to Palestine or some other place. I never heard of Ikeman until I came here to the trial. The expulsion was planned, yes, but not their physical elimination. I accept my responsibility for what happened under the regime, but not for crimes I had no knowledge of. And yes, I was the one who established the first concentration camps in 1933, but they were for communists and political enemies, not to kill people.
Never with the intention of turning them into extermination centers. Mr. Guring, do you truly believe that Hitler committed suicide? Do you consider it an act of cowardice? No, not at all. It wasn’t cowardice. Can you imagine Hitler locked up in a cell like this? He was the symbol of Germany, the spirit of the nation.
After the First World War, the Kaiser wasn’t put on trial and neither his emperor Hirohito, but Hitler would undoubtedly have been brought to trial. He knew that and that’s why he chose not to be captured. His death was consistent with his character. He didn’t want others to pay for him.
Even though I am here now to take on that responsibility, I told the court and I repeat it now. I accept that burden in his name. My words may sound hollow, but I say them with conviction. I have no doubt that he took his own life. Spear told me that on April 22nd, 1945, Eva Brown confessed to him that she and the furer would die together in Berlin. That’s enough for me.
I didn’t know Ava Brown well. I only saw her a couple of times. She wasn’t particularly beautiful, but she had good posture and a sweet personality. The important thing is that she lived only for him, as it should be. Hitler was content with her. He always respected women and criticized his officials who divorced to marry younger women. Look at some of the accused here.
Frick or Shacked, for example. who did just that against the furer’s wishes. Did you know that Shocked, over 60 years old, married a young woman and now he presents himself as a model of morality? Do you believe that Hitler truly cared for the German people? What is your opinion of his final testament which many have described as cold and vengeful? Hitler dedicated his entire life to the German people.
That was always his priority. That’s why I find it absurd that anyone would question his loyalty to Germany. Although I prefer not to speculate too much about the testament since I wasn’t there to witness him writing it. Some here Shiraak Shir Fritz say that this final text reveals his selfishness, his contempt for the people, his tendency to blame others for the defeat.
That tone may indeed be present. I won’t deny it. But many speak out of convenience, out of the need to distance themselves. What I do know is that Hitler was not a man who acted out of hatred for his nation. What he wrote in his final hours, only he could explain it. I prefer to remember the earlier Hitler, the determined leader obsessed with Germany’s destiny, not the man isolated in his bunker.
It was the former who left a mark on our generation. Despite his efforts to whitewash history, Herman Guring failed to hide his responsibility. In Nuremberg, he presented himself as a cultured and loyal leader, but he denied knowledge of the extermination and tried to cleanse Hitler’s image. The facts contradict him.
He was the number two of the regime, created the Gestapo, promoted the camps as early as 1933, and led the plundering of the Jews. His supposed ignorance of Avitz clashes with documents bearing his signature. Condemned to death, he committed suicide before he could be hanged. His legacy is that of a criminal who tried to conceal his guilt with words.
We now proceed with the interview of Anst Kton Bruner, head of the Reich main security office, responsible for the Gestapo, the Crypo, and the SD. Mr. Kelton Brunner as head of the Reich main security office. Could you explain the structure and evolution of that organization and how it was connected to other police forces within the Third Reich? Of course, although I must warn you that the structure was very complex and constantly evolving, to understand it properly, one must consider the political context of Germany from 1933 onward.
The RSHA, which functioned at a ministerial level from its creation until 1945, was a structure that became more consolidated as the years went by. I joined Hitler’s direct service in 1938, but I did not assume leadership of the organization until 1943. At the beginning, the German police were divided into several branches.
One of them was the security police which combined the criminal police with the political police. This merger took place in 1936. On the other hand, there was the regular police which consisted of three components. The Jearmms who operated in rural areas and handled local crime. The uniformed police in large cities who managed traffic, commerce, and public order.
and the fire brigade, which also had official functions, especially in rural areas where they acted as [Music] volunteers. After 1933, the Reich Criminal Police Office was centralized. While the political police which already existed before Hitler came to power was reorganized under the name Gahima politi aumpt or the gestapo.
This term was widely used by Germany’s enemies for propaganda purposes mimicking the Soviet GPU model although in Germany the simpler term stopapo was actually used. It is also important to clarify that neither the criminal police nor the Gustapo wore uniforms initially. Only the regular police wore uniforms. However, from 1935 onward, many members of the Gestapo and the criminal police began wearing SS uniforms since many of their agents were absorbed into the SS ranks from previous police forces.
Mr. Celton Brunner, you were head of the Reich main security office from 1943, a key position within the Nazi repressive apparatus. Could you explain how this institution operated? How it evolved from its beginnings and whether during your tenure, you had full knowledge of crimes such as the concentration camps, mass killings, gas chambers, or the repression against partisans and civilians.
I understand the intent behind the question, but I must answer honestly, even if it sounds incredible. Much of what I know today about these crimes I only learned here in Nuremberg during the trial. Before assuming my position in Berlin in 1943, I was unaware of the magnitude of the atrocities being committed.
I was completely ignorant of the existence of systematic exterminations. gas chambers, mass killings, or brutal repression both in the occupied territories and within the Reich itself. It was only when confronted with the documents and testimonies presented by the prosecution that I understood the real scale of these events.
I admit I was part of the structure, but my personal knowledge was very limited until then. Regarding the functioning of the Reich main security office, it was an extremely complex entity that evolved over time reflecting the changes in the Nazi state. It was created as a ministerial security organization operating between 1933 and 1945.
Although I joined the Furer service in 1938, I was only appointed head of the RSHA in 1943. To understand its origin, one must go back to 1933 when the German police system was similar to that of other countries with two main branches, the criminal police and the political police. In 1936, both merged under the name security police.
At the same time, there was the regular police divided into three core. The rural Jean Darmms, the urban police responsible for traffic and public order, and the fire police, which in many rural areas acted as an auxiliary force. Since 1933, the criminal police was centralized in the central criminal police office and the political police was organized into the gueheimet known as the Gestapo.
This term was spread by the regime’s enemies and derives from the Soviet GPU model. Although within Germany, the abbreviation stopapo was more commonly used. It should be clarified that neither the criminal police nor the Gestapo wore uniforms initially. Only the regular police were uniformed. However, starting in 1935, many agents of the Gestapo and the criminal police were integrated into the SS and began wearing their uniform, something that became common from then on.
Mr. Calenbrunner. How was the Reich’s security apparatus consolidated and what role did figures like Himmler and Hydrickch play in its development? There are many misunderstandings about how the police system in Germany was transformed. For example, in 1933 when the National Socialists came to power, there was no extermination of opponents within the police.
In Bavaria, only about 40 officers were removed from their positions. In Berlin, 21% of the force was replaced, mainly due to misconduct or insulting ministers of the new government. Can that be considered a violent purge? I don’t think so. It was in 1934 when Hydrris came onto the scene. The prosecution should focus more on his figure as his ambition for power knew no bounds.
He was extremely intelligent, manipulative, and skillful. At that time, Himmler was leading the SS, which was still a party organization and not a state one. I had a secondary role at that time. Within the SS there were different cores the general SS which made up more than 90% of the organization and some armed units like the Libandarta the Deutsland regiment or the Toten Cop forbenda known as the Death’s Head.
These troops were directly at the Furer service but were few in number. The traditional army opposed the SS having armed regiments and also rejected the existence of an independent air force. Only thanks to Guring because of his closeness to Hitler did the Luftvafa manage to develop as a separate branch. As to whether that was appropriate or not, I do not consider myself qualified to judge since I am not a military man.
Opinions were divided worldwide. For example, the Japanese divided their aviation between the army and the navy. While in the United States, it was part of the army. Regarding cohesion among air crew, it was a real thing different from that of the infantry. When Himmler realized that he could not create an armed force parallel to the army, he tried to gain power through the police.
It was then that Hydrickch taking advantage of his organizational talent unified the criminal police and the political police into the security police and later this structure was incorporated into the Reich main security office. Additionally, a third component was added the SD which was not a police force but an intelligence service.
And allow me to say one more thing. The diagram presented by the prosecution in court about the Reich main security office is incorrect. That is why I took pencil and paper and drew my own without thoroughly understanding this evolution. It is impossible to truly comprehend how the Third Reich’s security apparatus actually functioned. Mr.
Kton Bunner, could you clarify what the military situation of Germany was in 1941? It is often said that after the fall of France, the Third Reich was at its peak of power when it launched the offensive against the Soviet Union. Do you share that view? Additionally, how was the power of figures like Himmler and Hydrich consolidated within the regime and what impact did that have on the structure of the SS and the RSH? I understand the doubt, but I must say that interpretation is mistaken.
Although France had been defeated, the war against England was still ongoing and could not be considered over. Churchill himself acknowledged it. Those were the darkest days for Great Britain. Germany had not achieved a total victory in the west as long as England was not completely defeated. In fact, the British destroyed the French fleet, their former ally, and allowed the French government in exile to prepare to continue the war in Africa, which later facilitated the landing of American forces. So when the operation against
the Soviet Union was launched in June 1941, we still had serious commitments on the Western Front. At the same time, there was a concrete threat in the east. We did not have enough troops deployed there. While the Soviets had concentrated between 150 and 300 divisions on the border with Hungary and Romania, our intelligence detected that the USSR had built 120 airfields in Poland, whereas before there were only 20.
That expansion was a clear sign of military preparations, not friendly cooperation. No ally acts like that. And regarding the United States, it is true that technically Germany declared war, but it was the Americans who fired first with Roosevelt ordering attacks against our submarines. Therefore, the accusation of conspiracy to start wars of aggression is false.
And I say this here without needing documents. This trial is biased. Just today, the defense was denied the right to continue questioning Yodel, which shows how we are constantly restricted. This is not justice. It is a procedural strategy to silence us. Regarding Himmler and Hydrish, their rise marked the beginning of an internal crisis in the regime, not a military one, but a structural one.
The tribunal presents the SS as a homogeneous block, but that is incorrect. Many of the men who fought on the front lines had barely 10 weeks of training and never had any connection to the concentration camps. Even the Soviets who fought against the Vafen SS acknowledged that they were soldiers with their strengths and weaknesses just like in any army.
The SD at the beginning was not a police force. It was an internal intelligence service that the party used to observe itself, bypassing the normal institutional channels. Himmler and Hydrickch saw an opportunity for power there. By gathering information, even minor details like whether a gallider drank excessively or showed greed, they gained direct influence over Hitler.
Hydrickch, for example, passed that information to Borman, who presented it to the Furer, and thus power shifted to Himmler. Hydrickch accumulated so much power that he eventually overshadowed his own boss. I don’t think Himmler had him eliminated, but his death was certainly useful to him. Later, Borman replaced Hess, who was an idealist.
Borman, on the other hand, was a cold, stingy man with no allies. His influence grew because Hitler became increasingly distrustful and in an authoritarian regime that is dangerous. Everything depends on the leader’s judgment. And if that starts to lose objectivity, the whole system falls into crisis.
And to what extent did that lack of objectivity on Hitler’s part influence key decisions such as the war with the United States? Greatly. An authoritarian regime requires that the person at the top knows how to listen. But with Hitler, that became impossible. If someone suggested that perhaps America was not seeking war, he would simply silence them by banging on the table.
He believed that the United States needed to recoup its investment in armaments and loans and that this would make war inevitable. According to him, it was not an ideological conflict but an economic one. Hitler had a prodigious memory. He knew the tonnage of every fleet in the world in detail more than his own admirals, but he confused information with judgment.
And as soon as someone contradicted his ideas, he would shut down completely. That dynamic of concentrated power without objective control was one of the fundamental reasons why everything ended the way it did. Mr. Cton Brunner, how do you assess Heddrich’s rise and his relationship with figures like Dalega and Himmler? Do you think the nickname the hangman was appropriate? I met Daluega in 1943.
He was a man with delusions of grandeur. He claimed to have 3 million men under his command when in reality he had about 300,000. It was precisely this exaggerated tendency that led to his downfall. On the other hand, Hydrickch, with Borman’s help, managed to become protector of Bohemia Moravia after Vonraath’s dismissal.
This gave him ministerial rank, something even Himmler had not achieved by 1941. Himmler’s psychological reaction to that rise was understandable. One of his subordinates had surpassed him in rank. The same happened with Dalua, who until then had been on the same level as Hydrich. From a medical point of view, I believe that was the moment when the first symptoms of Daluega’s illness appeared.
He was clumsier, more vain, and less cunning than Hydrrich, but just as ambitious, though his way of seeking power was more passive and personal. Morally speaking, I would say he was more upright than Hydrickch, who had no qualms about using any method to advance. On the other hand, the nickname the hangman was not used for him within Germany.
But in my opinion, it was accurate. Heddrich was a sadistic man. Now, if we compare him to Himmler, the situation changes. Himmler was not exactly sadistic, but rather petty. He had that strict school master mentality, rigid and punishing. He took pleasure in correcting like a teacher who beats a child harder than necessary, believing he is educating him.
His drive was not sadism itself but an authoritarian conviction that he was shaping others character regarding the extermination of the Jews. I personally believe it was a consequence of his absolute obedience to the furer not a personal perversion. Carlton Bruner lied at Nuremberg as head of the Reich main security office.
He oversaw deportations, murders, and camps. He claimed ignorance, but he signed orders and received detailed reports. His role was key in Nazi repression. Sentenced to death, he was hanged in 1946. His attempt to evade responsibility did not save him from the final verdict. The interviews continue. We move on to Yoakim von Ribentrop, Nazi foreign minister, architect of the pact with Stalin, and a central figure in the Third Reich’s diplomatic propaganda.
Mr. Ribbonrop, could you share details about your youth and what factors influenced your development during those years? Since I was a child, I had an excellent memory, which made it easy for me to learn languages. I studied in castle in Mets, but I couldn’t say exactly how many years of formal schooling I completed.
I did not go beyond secondary level, if that. I spent some time in Switzerland where I also had private lessons and in London and France. At 17, I went to Canada supposedly to visit some friends, but I ended up staying there from 1910 until the outbreak of the First World War in 1915, 1914.
It was an interesting and pleasant time. I met many wealthy people and worked for a company involved in the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. I was a foreman and took part in building the Cantiever Bridge over the St. Lawrence River near [Music] Quebec. At some point, I contracted renal tuberculosis and at a hospital in Quebec, they removed my right kidney.
When I returned to Germany, I was accepted into the army, even though I did not meet the health standards. I served in a cavalry regiment until the end of the war. During the return trip, I left New York on a Dutch steamer. The ship was intercepted at Fulmouth, England, where a British officer told me I had to be interned along with other Germans.
However, a German engineer hid me in the coal compartment, and the officer did not search thoroughly, perhaps because we had had a friendly conversation. The ship continued onto the Netherlands from where I managed to reach Germany. Tuberculosis deeply marked my life. My mother died young in her early 30s from that same disease affecting her lungs and kidneys when I was 11 years old.
My older brother also fell ill in Canada and died in a Swiss sanatorium in 1918 at 26. That is why I believe tuberculosis is not only contagious but also hereditary. Mr. von Ribbonrop. How do you explain the growth of anti-semitism within the Nazi regime, especially in Hitler’s character? I believe part of Hitler’s radicalization came from his external influences.
In the United States, for example, President Roosevelt had a circle of advisers, the so-called brain trust made up of many Jews like Felix Frankfurter, Morgantha, and if I’m not mistaken, also Claude Pepper. This fueled Hitler’s perception that there was an international conspiracy with the Jews behind it, which reinforced his ideas about a global threat.
As for how I met Hitler, it was in 1932. I prefer not to specify the exact circumstances as there were other people present. What I clearly remember is his severe face, his very intense blue eyes, and that commanding look. At our second meeting in 1933, his influence was already much greater. I introduced him to Papen at my house and by then he already had an authoritarian and dominant attitude.
He was magnetic. There was something in his presence that made one unable to stop listening. He would speak non-stop for 20 or 30 minutes and one could barely intervene. He changed topics with impressive fluency covering all kinds of issues. It is true what a British statesman said. You cannot reason with a dictator.
With Hitler, one only listened. He completely dominated everyone present. Now, how do you evaluate Hitler’s personality, especially in light of what has been revealed in these trials, such as the case of Hansf Frank’s diary? Hitler was an exceptional figure. His ability to attract the masses was impressive.
The whole of Germany seemed like a child before him. And although Borman had power, he treated him like a teacher. Despite everything, that does not mean we knew what was really happening behind the scenes. For years, many of us had no idea about the atrocities being committed. The revelations from this trial, like those from Hansfrank’s diary, have deeply surprised me.
I don’t understand why Frank wrote such horrifying things like that. that if he had informed Hitler about the death of 150,000 more Poles, Hitler would have congratulated him. That shocked me, but more because of the recklessness of putting it in writing. I find it hard to accept that any of this could be true, although I have to admit that some things must be.
Hearing the Russians speak in court gives the impression that all Germans were monsters. Of course, there were excesses and brutalities, and yes, they are condemnable. But what worries me most is how these actions are presented. I cannot accept that we all knew about or approved such acts. That simply is not true. Let’s now talk about your involvement in the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.
How did decision-m work within the Nazi regime, especially regarding foreign policy? I remember very well my visit to Moscow when we signed the non-aggression pact with Stalin. I was there barely a day and a night and then I returned for a grand banquet where much toasting took place. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, was a very competent and intelligent man, while Stalin ruled Russia with absolute authority, just as Hitler did in Germany.
Both dictators had their peoples in the palm of their hands. In our case, Hitler maintained a deliberate policy. Each minister was to know only what related to their area of work. As foreign minister, I was not informed about the invasion of Norway until 24 hours before it began. And the same happened with the invasion of the Soviet Union.
I was only informed one day prior to its start. The chancellory was completely excluded from military affairs. [Music] It is curious, but I must say I had a fairly cordial relationship with Stalin and Molotov. At that time, diplomacy was fluid. And it seems ironic that in these trials, all that is now seen retrospectively with such distance, given the terrible contradiction with the atrocities we have heard.
It is hard not to see how those scenes of banquetss and diplomacy now feel in congruent with what happened afterward. Regarding the trial you were involved in, how do you evaluate the foreign policy of the Third Reich and its relation to the world conflict, especially concerning the Treaty of Versailles? I have reflected a lot on this in recent months.
Hitler’s rise was a direct response to the Treaty of Versailles, a treaty I consider a great injustice to Germany. I remember that in 1928 and 1929 before joining the party and before Hitler came to power, I already warned my French and English friends that if they did not support the Bruning government, they would soon face Hitler.
They did nothing and the result was what we all know. As for this trial, I consider it a monumental mistake. It does not matter if they condemn Guring, me or others. That is not the essential point. The message sent to the German people is what really matters. Despite our actions, they will continue to see us as their leaders, whether they are right or not.
In a few years, even you Americans will see this process as a political mistake. The German population will begin to hate the Americans, distrust the British and French, and worst of all, it could fall under Soviet influence. That would be a catastrophe for Germany. Hitler was always an enigma to me. He applied the strategy of divide and conquer, even within his own government.
He never allowed any of his ministers to gain too much power. In the end, he even replaced me as foreign minister in his will. I don’t understand it. I was one of his most loyal followers, perhaps the most faithful. As for the Jewish question, I admit that the extermination will be seen as a terrible stain in Germany’s history. But one must understand that Hitler lost his sense of proportion.
As the war slipped away from him, he became obsessed with this issue. In 1940, I sent envoys to the United States to contact Jewish banking houses and tried to keep America out of the conflict as well as to pressure England to achieve peace. But the response was cold. The Jews did not trust us and refused to cooperate. If we had reached an agreement with England in 1940, perhaps those horrors could have been avoided.
But history took a different course. Mr. Ribbentrop, do you sincerely believe that the world’s opposition to Nazi Germany was solely the result of a Jewish conspiracy? Or do you acknowledge that the democracies rejected Nazism because of its aggressive fascist and totalitarian nature? Look, I believe Hitler did not want to dominate the world as is often said.
He assured me he only sought the Sudatan land, the Polish corridor to trade with Austria and perhaps to regain some colonies. According to him, there was no intention to go beyond that. although later he deviated. I remember when I returned from Moscow after signing the non-aggression pact with Stalin. I told Hitler that I did not see Jews in command in Russia except for a certain Kaganovich, a cordial man.
But Hitler ignored my words. For him, the Jews were responsible for the war, a fanciful alliance between Jewish capitalism and Jewish bulsheism. I never understood that. I knew it was not true. But his obsession grew until it became sickly. He even accused me after the July 20th assassination attempt of trying to arrange a secret peace in Sweden.
That hurt me deeply. I did not respond. I just saluted and left. I was his most faithful follower and yet he distrusted me. Hitler was an enigma, a mixture of kindness and brutality. And although he had a caring side, his distrust ruined his relationships. He came to power because the people with no alternatives preferred Nazism over communism.
We had 7 million unemployed. For many, Hitler was the only way out. Ribbentrop tried to justify himself with personal stories and blaming others, but he was an essential part of the Nazi criminal machinery. Sentenced to death at Nuremberg, he was hanged on October 16th, 1946, showing no true remorse.
We now move to the final interview with Carl Donuts, Hitler’s designated successor, Admiral of thes Marine, and responsible for the submarine warfare that ravaged the Atlantic during the Third Reich. Admiral Donuts, how do you summarize your participation in the Third Reich, your relationship with Hitler and the knowledge you had about the regime’s atrocities? My desire is to retire with my wife, write my memoirs, and let the German people understand what really happened.
Because most of us, even in leadership, knew nothing about the crimes of Hitler or Himmler. I know that is hard to understand from an American perspective, but in our system, the rule was clear. Mind your own business and do your job. That’s how everything worked. I had no knowledge of plans for aggressive war, nor of the extermination of the Jews, nor of the supposed intention to annihilate 30 million slaves, nor of the atrocities in Poland or Russia.
What I did know was that the Soviets committed similar crimes during their advance through East Prussia, although I admit that information came partly from the German press, not from direct sources. My life has been difficult. I served in the Navy since the First World War. In 1935, Admiral Rder called me to reorganize the submarine force.
I hadn’t had contact with the world of submarines for a long time, so I had to learn everything I knew. It was tough, humidity, oil, cold, nothing good for rheumatism. Until 1943, I barely saw Hitler once every two years. After that, I began seeing him more frequently, and in the last months, the contact was constant.
When I was informed of his suicide and that he had designated me as his successor, I knew I had to seek peace immediately. That’s what I did. It’s true that at first it was announced we would surrender only to the British and Americans, not to the Russians, but that was symbolic. We knew the surrender would be total. I never saw myself as Hitler’s political successor.
They chose me because as a nonpartisan figure, I could manage that transition. Regarding the so-called fur prince, I never approved of it. I always believed that a leader needs a corrective, advisers, a chief of staff. Did I ever confront Hitler? Number one was a man of the sea and that was my duty. I think many of the worst crimes were committed by Austrians or at least by Bavarians.
They are temperamental, emotional. Northerners like me are more reserved, more thoughtful. And yes, I believe Guring is telling the truth when he says he didn’t know more than he has declared. It may seem impossible for a democracy, but in our system it was feasible. I barely spoke to Ribbonrop a couple of times, and I met Shirak in 1944.
I had no personal ties with almost any of the accused. Admiral Donuts, after everything that has come to light in this tribunal, how do you interpret what happened during the Nazi regime and your role in it? Frankly, I do not believe that most of us in the leadership truly knew what was really happening. I know it sounds unbelievable to an American, but in our command system, orders flowed downward and there was rarely a complete overview from above.
Personally, I continue to reject the accusations of atrocities committed at sea, and I still harbor doubts about many of the alleged atrocities committed on land. I say this because even among us, disbelief persists. Look, when that documentary was shown where the people of VHimar are seen happily walking toward Bhenvald, doctors Kelly and Gilbert told me that the change in their faces upon leaving the camp clearly showed they had no idea what was happening there.
And it’s true. They look calm when entering and devastated when leaving. That contrast. And yes, I accept as evidence. That footage was authentic. But regarding the other crimes, I still have my reservations. That shows, if anything, how little some of us knew about what was really going on. Many of us here today only saw our own roles. I was a man of the sea.
I served my country in wars, followed orders, and never strayed from my naval duties. Today, some try to directly link us to the regime’s most atrocious crimes. And I perceive that more as a political strategy than justice. I consider myself innocent of any personal crime. Admiral Dunitz, after accepting the leadership of Germany following Hitler’s death, how do you interpret your role in the war and the accusations being made against you here? Look, I’m not a politician.
I was a corvette captain when the war began. I barely knew Hitler before 1942. And the little I saw of him at that time seemed reasonable. His demands appeared aimed at Germany’s welfare. But now I see he had little regard for other peoples such as the Jews or neighboring states. However, I never knew anything about what was being done to the Jews.
Hitler had a clear rule. Everyone should mind their own business. And mine was submarines and the navy. Accepting the leadership of the country after his suicide was not a crime. Someone had to take responsibility in that chaos, and I did it to prevent power from falling into the East’s hands.
I knew we had to surrender, but I preferred to do so before the British and Americans. Is that a crime? Maybe for the Russians it is, but from a Western point of view, I don’t think so. I insist that this accusation against me is baseless. I’m not linked to atrocities or political decisions of extermination.
The only concrete accusation is that I supposedly ordered not to rescue survivors from sunk ships. That was denied by the prosecution’s own witnesses. In fact, the US Navy officer who presented the case ended up helping my defense unintentionally. His witnesses confirmed that in any Navy, if a submarine is in danger, it cannot stay to rescue.
That applies to you and to us. Where is the crime? If Germany had won the war, I am convinced that the power of the Nazi party would have been reduced. The soldiers and sailors returning home would not have allowed themselves to be governed by fanatic neighborhood leaders. They would have demanded freedom and the regime probably would have collapsed soon.
I don’t believe Hitler would have grown stronger after everything we now know, the massacres, the atrocities committed in the party’s name. It’s most likely that a military government would have taken control. And I’m not the only one who sees the absurdity of this. Can we Germans judge Roosevelt, Morganthaw, Churchill, or Eden for their war decisions? No, and we wouldn’t have done so even if we had won. Nations must judge themselves.
To think that a foreign tribunal can judge a sovereign government is to me a mistake. And the fact that there are Russian judges sitting in Nuremberg, that outrages me. They sank German ships with civilians aboard, men, women, children, and no one judges them. Nor are you free of guilt. You armed merchant ships even before officially entering the war.
All this seems to me a distortion of justice. Admiral Donuts, after your defense, how do you interpret the political situation following the war, especially in relation to the Soviet Union and the accusations being made against you here in Nuremberg? I am not a politician and I am not interested in power games, but I know how to recognize a problem when I see one, and Russia is one.
Even before the trial, I received a very favorable note through my lawyer from Allied officers. The Russians accuse me of having directed troops and fleets westward instead of handing them over to the Red Army, as if that were a crime. But both General Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, and Marshall Montgomery thanked me for preventing the German fleet and 3 million soldiers from falling into Soviet hands.
I knew what would happen if I did. That force would eventually turn against us. The Russians will never withdraw their troops from East Germany or the Balkans. They want to expand communism. They are surrounding Turkey. Even Ernest Bevine said it. The Potdam agreement was a grave mistake. Harold Laskkey of the British Labor Party also stated this.
Look at the map. Germany’s granaries, the wheat and potatoes are in the Russian zone. They will not leave there. Everything they have done in this past year indicates that they are aligning themselves against the West, especially against the United States and Great Britain. Another war? I doubt it. With weapons like the atomic bomb, everyone fears the first strike.
But that conflicts are coming, I do not doubt. I saw a cartoon in the Herald Tribune. the world divided by a trench with the US and the UK on one side and the USSR on the other. While I am imprisoned, I cannot say more. But if one day I am released, I will write a lot. Russia is, in my opinion, the most criminal nation in the world, and communism the greatest evil.
It is almost ironic that they accuse me of political conspiracy when they are the ones who are always conspiring. Even before the war, the Soviets demanded a piece of Denmark and parts of Poland. And now they come to judge me. Was there any kind of anti-semitic policy within the Navy? Were you aware of the fate of the Jews during the war? In the Marine, there were no anti-semitic policies.
I can name at least four officers of Jewish origin. One of them was Vice Admiral Bernhard Roger, responsible for the training of naval cadets until the end of the war. I also had a Jewish captain. Roger even testified in my favor. If any of them had known what Himmler and Hitler were doing to the Jews, they would have told me without hesitation.
I once received a letter from Hitler in 1943 complaining that a Jew roger was in charge of naval education. I replied that he should mind his own business. Our navy was like an island. We had total autonomy. On several occasions, Hitler suggested that political or disciplinary offenses within the Navy be judged by the party or the SS.
I always refused. My position was clear. The Navy had to judge its own without external interference. And regarding my knowledge of the persecutions, I will tell you this. My responsibility began with the submarine warfare from 1933 and with the entirety of the Navy from 1943. What happened to the Jews or on the Eastern front was not within my scope.
I am accused of things that simply do not concern me. I did not know what was happening to the Jews in Germany. I did not see it. I did not know. And what little I read at the time was not enough to understand the magnitude of what was really going on. Admiral Donuts, did you have any personal attitude towards the Jews? Were you ever aware of their persecution during the [Music] regime? No, I was not.
I was completely absorbed in naval affairs from morning till night. In the cremarine, we had no Jewish problem as it was called in other branches. I never held prejudices. Let me tell you something. In 1934, I stopped at a Spanish port and wanted to invite a German Jewish merchant who owned lead mines in northern Spain to lunch aboard my ship.
We arranged it with the German consul, but when I mentioned that his daughter would also attend, the consul told me it was impossible. He is Jewish, he said. My aid smiled because he knew how I thought. I replied that my ship was my jurisdiction and I decided who came aboard. So they came. The man was very decent. When we sailed, my aid gave me a blue and white porcelain plate from a very old local factory.
It was a gift from that man who did not want to give it directly out of discretion. I corresponded with him until 1939. He wrote that his daughter had married a Spanish prince. I heard no more. So, no, I did not know of any persecutions. If anyone wants to say that makes me complicit, I do not accept it. My conscience is clear. I did not participate in brutality or criminality.
I limited myself to doing my job in the Navy. I cannot be linked to what others did. Admiral Donuts, how do you evaluate this trial and your relationship with the other accused as well as the role of leaders like Hitler, Himmler, Kadel, or Celton Bruner in the crimes of the regime? Sometimes this trial seems like a farce to me.
What they do with us matters little, but accusing all of us of conspiracy is absurd. My case is clear. I directed the submarine warfare from 1933 and the entires marine from 1943 and I accept that responsibility. But holding me responsible for what others did is simply false. Each person must be accountable for their own area.
If this trial were limited to judging who ordered the killing of Jews, I wouldn’t have been here more than 3 hours. But I’ve been sitting here since November, hearing the same things over and over again. At this point, half the time I draw or write down my thoughts regarding my fellow defendants. In Mondorf, I didn’t greet Guring. I disliked him.
I didn’t even know Striker. Now we talk. We share a fate. And that unites us. Although deep down I know we are not all the same. Katel completely submissive to Hitler. Calton Bruner. He was under Himmler who is the true responsible for the atrocities of the repressive apparatus. If I had received those orders, I would have rejected them.
What bothers me most is that this trial does not have the two true culprits sitting here, Hitler and Himmler. They were the origin of everything. And to try to judge us as a homogeneous group without distinguishing real responsibilities is the greatest mistake of this process. Duritz denied everything, but documents and testimonies proved him wrong.
He supported Hitler until the end, legitimized the regime, and signed orders that prolonged the suffering. He was neither uninvolved nor innocent. At Nuremberg, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. His account sought to exonerate himself, but history did not absolve him.