When Baghdad fell in April 2003, most people  assumed Saddam Hssein s sons Uday and Qusay   would simply disappear or surrender. For  months, it looked exactly like that. But   then American forces received a single tip  about a house on a quiet street in Mosul,   and what unfolded over the next ten hours  would shock everyone who witnessed it.

Saddam Hussein had built an entire system,  and his two sons were a major part of it. Uday Hussein was born on June 18, 1964. As  Saddam’s oldest son, he grew up with power,   money, and almost no consequences for  his actions. He controlled the Iraqi   Olympic Committee, the national football  federation, and two newspapers.

 On paper,   he looked like a man involved in  sports and culture. In reality,   athletes who lost competitions were often taken  to the basement of the Olympic headquarters on   Palestine Street in Baghdad and tortured.  The building contained iron bars, whips,   and even a concrete pool used for punishment.  Uday personally took part in some of these abuses.

His violence was often driven  by impulse rather than politics.   In December 1988, during a party on the banks  of the Tigris hosted by Suzanne Mubarak,   the wife of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak,  Uday beat Kamel Hanna Gegeo to death with an   electric carving knife and a cane.

 Gegeo was  Saddam’s personal food taster and a trusted   member of the household. Uday believed Gegeo  had helped arrange one of Saddam’s affairs   without telling him. He killed him in front of  dozens of guests. Saddam briefly jailed Uday and   then sent him to Switzerland in a diplomatic  position. Within a year, he was back in Iraq. In December 1996, gunmen attacked Uday’s motorcade  in Baghdad’s Mansour district.

 He was hit by eight   bullets but survived. The attack left him with  shattered bones in his left leg, permanent nerve   damage, a limp, the loss of one kidney, and  constant pain for the rest of his life. The   attack was widely believed to have been carried  out by members of the al-Dulaimi tribe, although   this was never officially confirmed. Afterwards,  Uday became even more unpredictable and violent.

Qusay Hussein was born on May 17,  1966. He was quieter, more disciplined,   and far more important to the day-to-day survival  of the regime. While Uday attracted attention,   Qusay built power behind the scenes.  He controlled the Republican Guard,   the Special Security Organization, and  the Fedayeen Saddam.

 He also oversaw   the surveillance system that helped  keep Saddam’s grip on the country. After the failed Shia uprising of 1991, which  followed the Gulf War, Qusay supervised the   regime’s response in southern Iraq. Villages  were burned, thousands of people were executed,   and large sections of the marshlands were  drained to remove hiding places for survivors.

By 2001, Saddam had publicly identified Qusay  as his preferred successor during the ninth   Baath Party Congress. It was essentially  the first step toward making him Iraq’s   next ruler. Uday was considered too unstable  for the position, although he still remained   powerful and influential through his control of  the Fedayeen Saddam in the years before the war.

When the U.S.-led invasion began on March  20, 2003, both brothers became top targets.   The coalition created a deck of 55 playing cards  featuring the most wanted members of the Iraqi   regime. Uday was the Jack of Hearts. Qusay  was the Jack of Clubs. Their father was the   Ace of Spades. Yet for the first four months  after the invasion, all three disappeared.

Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003. Soon afterwards,   the Hussein family scattered across  Iraq. Saddam moved between safe   houses throughout the Sunni Triangle. His  sons traveled separately in small groups,   avoiding phones and electronic communications  they knew could be tracked.

 Few people understood   surveillance better than they did. They had  used it against millions of Iraqis for years. By early July 2003, Uday and Qusay had arrived  in Mosul, a city of about 1.8 million people   in northern Iraq’s Nineveh province. Mosul  was home to Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens,   Christians, and Shabaks.

 It also contained strong  connections to former Baath Party networks,   making it one of the few places where  loyal supporters could still hide them. The brothers took shelter in a villa in the Falah  neighborhood of western Mosul. The house belonged   to Nawaf Zidan al-Zaydan, a tribal figure with  ties to the former regime. It was a typical   two-story Iraqi villa built from reinforced  concrete, with thick walls, small windows,   and a walled compound. It was designed to blend  into the neighborhood, not stand out.

 There   were no guards outside and no visible signs that  two of the most wanted men in Iraq were inside. Qusay brought his 14-year-old son, Mustapha,  with him. A single bodyguard was also staying   in the house. In total, there were only  four people inside a villa surrounded by   an ordinary neighborhood in a city  now controlled by American forces.

The situation could not last. During the early hours of July 22, 2003, an Iraqi  informant contacted U.S. forces in Mosul. The   information was very specific: Uday and Qusay  Hussein were hiding inside a villa in the Falah   neighborhood. The informant knew exactly what was  at stake.

 The United States had offered a reward   of $15 million for each brother, a total of $30  million, for information leading to their capture   or confirmed death. It was one of the largest  rewards ever offered during a military operation. The intelligence was passed up the chain of  command immediately. Major General David Petraeus,   commander of the 101st Airborne Division  and the officer responsible for Mosul and   the surrounding region, was informed.

  Since arriving in Mosul in April 2003,   Petraeus had focused on stabilizing  the city and targeting remaining   Baathist networks. This was the most  important lead he had received so far. The decision was made to move that same morning.  Speed was critical. Every hour increased the   chance that the brothers would escape. But the  operation also had to be carefully planned.

 A   mistake could allow the targets to slip away or  lead to a disastrous raid on the wrong location. By late morning, American forces were  quietly moving into position around   the Falah neighborhood. About 200 soldiers  from the 101st Airborne Division took part,   supported by members of Task Force 20, the  secretive special operations unit responsible for   hunting high-value targets across Iraq. Armored  vehicles blocked nearby roads.

 Helicopters waited   overhead. The neighborhood was gradually sealed  off without alerting the people inside the villa. At approximately 10:00 a.m.  local time, the operation began. The first phase followed standard  procedure. U.S. forces approached   the villa and ordered the occupants to  surrender. The response was gunfire.

The shooting began immediately and was  accurate enough to force the first group   of soldiers to pull back. Within minutes,  four American soldiers had been wounded.   Troops moved behind vehicles and walls while  commanders quickly reassessed the situation. What had started as a capture  mission was now becoming a siege.

The villa itself was a major problem. Its  reinforced concrete walls absorbed small-arms   fire with little effect. The men inside could fire  through windows while remaining largely protected.   Every attempt to move closer to the building  was met with sustained and well-aimed gunfire.   The four people inside were not panicking.  They were fighting according to a plan.

American forces escalated. Humvees  equipped with M2 .50-caliber machine   guns opened fire on the building.  Mark 19 automatic grenade launchers,   capable of firing 40mm grenades at high  rates, targeted the upper floor. M1126   Stryker armored vehicles moved into positions  where they could fire directly at the structure.

The villa absorbed the punishment, and  the shooting from inside continued. Above the neighborhood, OH-58D Kiowa  helicopters circled the compound,   providing surveillance and supporting  the troops on the ground. Residents who   had not already fled were trapped inside  nearby homes, listening as what sounded   like a full-scale battle unfolded in  the middle of a residential street.

Even with all that firepower, the  defenders inside the villa kept fighting. By midday, the operation had been  going on for about two hours,   and the villa was still holding out.  U.S. commanders decided to use heavier   weapons that were rarely used against  a single house in a residential area. TOW missiles were fired directly into the villa.

  These missiles were designed to destroy heavily   armored tanks. They punched through the walls,  causing major damage. Parts of the upper floor   collapsed. Fires broke out inside. A section  of the roof on the eastern side came down. The gunfire from inside slowed down. Then it  stopped for a short time. Then it started again. This is the part that many people who were  there still struggle to explain.

 Anti-tank   missiles had torn through the building. Parts of  the house were collapsing. Fires were spreading   inside. Yet people were still shooting back.  Four people inside a burning and collapsing   house were continuing to fight against around  200 soldiers supported by attack helicopters. The battle continued for more than four hours.

At around 3:00 PM local time, the  gunfire from inside finally stopped.   After more than five hours of fighting,  the weapons inside the villa fell silent.   U.S. forces stayed in position. Parts  of the building were still burning.   Rubble covered the street. No one rushed  inside. The perimeter remained secure.

Then the slow process of  clearing the building began. Entering a building that had been hit by anti-tank  missiles, thousands of machine-gun rounds,   and fire was not something soldiers could do  quickly. Small teams moved forward carefully   through the debris. The structure was unstable  and could collapse further at any moment.  

Smoke still filled what remained of the rooms. Inside, they found four bodies. Uday Hussein. Qusay Hussein. A  bodyguard. And Mustapha Hussein. How a 14-year-old ended up inside that siege  remains unclear. Nobody knows whether Qusay   had nowhere else to leave him, whether Mustapha  chose to stay, or whether anyone inside the villa   truly believed they could survive. What is known  is that he was there, and that he died there.

The bodies were removed and taken to a secure  U.S. military facility. By the time the site was   completely cleared and secured, it was after 8:00  PM. The operation had lasted from roughly 10:00   AM until 8:30 PM, about ten and a half hours  from the first contact to the final clearance. The identification process began immediately,  but proving who they were would not be simple.

The U.S. military could not afford to make  a mistake. The entire importance of the   operation depended on correctly  identifying the bodies. A wrong   announcement would have been a major  embarrassment and a propaganda disaster. The first step was physical identification.

  Uday’s body showed the well-known injuries   from the 1996 assassination attempt. His  damaged left leg, bone reconstruction work,   and evidence of multiple surgeries matched  medical records obtained through intelligence   sources. Qusay also had several identifying  features. Investigators compared measurements,   dental records, and physical markings  with existing intelligence files.

On July 24, 2003, two days after the battle,   U.S. Central Command officially confirmed  the identities. General Ricardo Sanchez,   commander of coalition ground forces in Iraq,  announced that Uday and Qusay Hussein were dead. Many Iraqis did not believe it. Years of government lies about wars, casualties,  and missing people had created deep distrust of   official statements. American announcements  were treated with the same suspicion.

 Rumors   quickly spread through Baghdad and Mosul.  Some claimed the brothers had escaped.   Others said the bodies were fake or that  the entire operation had been staged. This was more than a public relations problem.  One of the main goals of the operation was to   show that the old regime was finished. Instead,  many people were refusing to believe the evidence.

On July 24 and 25, U.S. military  officials made a controversial   decision. They released photographs of the bodies. These were not distant or heavily edited images.  They clearly showed the faces of men who had died   violently. The photographs were distributed  to news organizations around the world.

The images appeared on Arabic satellite  television, in newspapers, and across   the Middle East within hours. Al Jazeera  broadcast them. Iraqi state television,   now under coalition control, showed them  as well. The faces were clearly visible,   along with the damage caused by the battle. Even then, some Iraqis insisted  the bodies had been replaced or   staged. The debate followed predictable  lines.

 Those most loyal to the former   regime were often the least willing  to accept that the brothers were dead. On July 28, 2003, Brigadier General Mark  Kimmitt held a detailed press conference. He   presented height measurements, weight estimates,  dental comparisons, physical characteristics,   and DNA results. The evidence was presented piece  by piece in front of journalists and cameras.

For much of the international  community and many Iraqis,   the case was settled. For some people, no  amount of evidence would ever be enough. The Iraqi informant who provided the tip  on July 22 reportedly received the full   $30 million reward. Exactly how and when the  payment was made has never been publicly revealed.

The deaths of Uday and Qusay were  expected to be a major turning point.   U.S. officials had argued that removing  key figures from Saddam’s regime would   weaken the insurgency and convince more  Iraqis to cooperate with coalition forces. That is not what happened. In the weeks after July 22, attacks on  coalition troops in the Sunni Triangle   continued at roughly the same pace. By August  2003, the insurgency was actually growing.

On August 7, a car bomb hit the Jordanian  Embassy in Baghdad, killing 19 people. On   August 19, a truck bomb destroyed the United  Nations headquarters at the Canal Hotel,   killing 22 people, including Sergio Vieira  de Mello. On August 29, a car bomb in   Najaf killed more than 85 people, including  senior Shia cleric Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim.

The insurgency had already developed its own  networks, funding, and motivations. It no longer   depended on Saddam’s sons being alive. Former  Baath Party members, tribal loyalties, foreign   fighters crossing from Syria, and growing anger  over unemployment, de-Baathification policies, and   the decision to dissolve the Iraqi Army on May 23,  2003, were the real forces driving the violence.

Killing Uday and Qusay removed  two powerful men. It did not   remove the deeper problems  that were fueling the war. Islamic tradition calls for a burial  within 24 hours of death. But the   U.S. military kept the bodies of  Uday and Qusay for eleven days. The delay was caused by the identification  process and the uncertainty over what to   do with the remains of two internationally  wanted figures who were also the sons of a   former head of state who was still on the run.  There was no clear procedure for a situation  

like this. Eventually, the decision was made to  release the bodies to family representatives. On August 2, 2003, the bodies of Uday, Qusay,  and Mustapha Hussein were handed over to a   tribal representative and taken to Awja, a  small town about 12 kilometers south of Tikrit   in Saladin Province.

 Awja was Saddam Hussein’s  birthplace and held deep tribal importance for   the Hussein family. The three were buried  in the family cemetery during a private   burial. There was no public ceremony, no official  mourning, and no state recognition of any kind. Saddam Hussein learned about the deaths  of his sons while hiding somewhere in the   Sunni Triangle.

 No confirmed account of his  immediate reaction exists, but people who   later claimed to have been with him in various  safe houses said he appeared deeply shaken. Saddam continued moving between hiding  places around Tikrit during the rest of 2003.   On December 13, 2003, U.S. Army soldiers  from the 4th Infantry Division captured   him during Operation Red Dawn near the  town of Ad-Dawr, about 15 kilometers   south of Tikrit.

 He was found alone inside  a small underground hiding place roughly   two meters deep and one meter wide on a  farm owned by the Mohammed Ibrahim Omar   al-Musslit family. He was unshaven, carrying  $750,000 in cash, and offered no resistance. The man who had ruled Iraq through  fear for 24 years was pulled from   a hole in the ground by soldiers from  a country he had once believed could   not defeat him. He was captured  without a single shot being fired.

His trial before the Iraqi Special Tribunal  began on October 19, 2005. He was charged   over the 1982 killing of 148 Shia men and  boys from the town of Dujail after a failed   assassination attempt against him. On November 5,  2006, he was found guilty and sentenced to death. On December 30, 2006, at about 6:00 AM, Saddam  Hussein was executed by hanging at Camp Justice,   a former military intelligence facility in  Baghdad’s Khadimiya district.

 The execution   was carried out by Iraqi authorities. Someone in  the room recorded the final moments on a mobile   phone. The video leaked within hours  and quickly spread across the world.   It showed taunts being shouted as the trapdoor  opened. It was not a carefully controlled state   execution. It was chaotic, messy, and watched  by millions on small screens around the world.

The battle on Falah Street is often treated  as just another event in the larger Iraq War.   It gets mentioned briefly and then  forgotten. But what happened there   on July 22, 2003, was in many ways a  small version of the entire conflict. Around 200 American soldiers, attack  helicopters, Stryker armored vehicles,   anti-tank missiles, and Special Operations forces   were all used against a single two-story  concrete house containing four people.

The operation lasted more than ten hours. The amount of firepower needed to kill four  people inside one building destroyed much   of the structure and shook the  entire neighborhood around it.   The mission succeeded. But the amount of  time, effort, and destruction required to   achieve that goal says a great deal about  the kind of war that was being fought.