What Was the Most Brutal Execution by Nazi Death Squads?

The Insat group represent one of the darkest chapters of the Holocaust. Extermination squads that murdered face-to-face more than 1 million people. Their revolution began long before the war. On January 30th, 1933, the appointment of Adolf Hitler as chancellor introduced a political change that quickly altered the institutional structures of the German state.

 The inauguration ceremony maintained republican forms, but the internal dynamics of the regime were oriented from the beginning to disable any legal limits to the authority of the executive. The richest fire on February 27th provided the pretext to declare a state of emergency and suspend fundamental freedoms by presidential decree.

 From that moment, the police obtained expanded powers to make arrests without judicial oversight, close party headquarters, and confiscate publications considered subversive. The enabling act of March 23rd approved under pressure in an already disbanded parliament granted the government the ability to legislate by decree, creating a framework that allowed the progressive elimination of political opposition.

During the following months, the parties were banned or absorbed into a centralized control structure. Independent unions were dissolved on the 2nd of May and replaced by the German labor front, which acted as a labor surveillance instrument. The first waves of arrests primarily affected communists  and social democrats who were sent to improvised detention facilities.

Among them, Dhaka stood out. Created in March of 1,933 under Bavarian Police Administration. Although its initial operation lacked uniform rules, it introduced practices of isolation, physical punishment, and systematic registration of inmates that would be replicated in other centers. The rapid expansion of this network allowed the regime to have an effective tool of intimidation that complemented the legislative  process.

In this initial phase, the sturmab tailong or SA played a prominent role with approximately 3 million members. It patrolled streets, organized marches, and carried out pressure operations against opponents. Its massive structure offered the regime a visible militant presence, but it also caused internal discipline  problems.

 Anst rum its leader advocated the idea of turning the SA into the base for a future revolutionary army which raised concerns in the Vermacht and in conservative sectors of the state. Meanwhile, Hinrich Himmler was consolidating the role of the SS as a select organization, smaller but disciplined and oriented towards security tasks.

Reinhardt Hydrich at the head of the SS intelligence service known as the SD developed methods of collecting information on parties, associations, and social trends that fed into national reports. The rivalry between the SA and the SS became a decisive element in the configuration of the repressive apparatus.

 The crisis culminated between the 30th of June and the 2nd of July of 1,934 with the purge known as the night of the long knives. Hitler pressured by military commanders and backed by Himmler and Herman Guring authorized the arrest and execution of Rome and numerous SA leaders. The operation also included figures that the regime considered politically dangerous such as Kurt Fon Schliker.

 Although the exact number of victims remains a subject of debate, the minimum documented figures record at least 85 dead. After the purge, Hitler declared the SS an independent organization on the 20th of July, which confirmed its ascent within the system. The loyalty demonstrated by Himler and Hydrich consolidated their position as administrators  of the coercive apparatus.

 From that moment, the SS undertook a reorganization of the police that transformed the institutional balance of the state. The Gestapo, formerly under Hydrickch’s direction since April of 1,934, acquired the ability to act without judicial controls, which made it a central instrument of political surveillance.

 The crypo in charge of common crimes shifted from being under regional authorities to being integrated into a unified system following SS guidelines. The SD collected reports on social attitudes and environments considered politically relevant, preparing periodic analyses that guided security policies. Between 1,936 and 1,937, these institutions came under Himmler’s direct authority in his capacity as chief of German police.

 This integration ensured vertical coordination between  state police, security forces, and party structures. In 1,939, the creation of the Reich Zika Heights hopdant or RSHA formalized this centralization and placed Hydrich at the head of an organization capable of identifying, investigating, and neutralizing any group considered contrary to the new order.

 This apparatus was applied with particular rigor to the Jewish population against which legislative pressure had intensified. The Neuremberg laws enacted in  September of 1,935 redefined membership in the national body in racial terms. They established categories based on ancestry, stripped Jews of citizenship, and prohibited marriages and sexual relations between Jews and non-Jews.

Their implementation triggered a series of ordinances that restricted economic participation, access to education, and professional practice. The Aryanization processes became more frequent between 1,936 and 1,938, forcing the sale of businesses  and properties at state controlled values.

 This administrative framework created the conditions for systematic exclusion which as it progressed caused a significant migratory flow. In this context, the night from the EZ months, 9th to the 10th of November of 1938, marked a qualitative change in anti-semitic policy. Following the assassination of diplomat Ernst Famat, the regime activated a planned operation that was presented as a spontaneous reaction.

 The directives issued by Hadish during the early morning hours indicated how to proceed with the burning of synagogues, destruction of establishments, and mass arrests. More than 1,400 synagogues were destroyed or damaged. Around 7,500 Jewish businesses were devastated and numerous cemeteries, homes, and community centers were attacked.

 Official figures mentioned 91 dead, although later records show a higher number. About 30,000 Jewish men were arrested and transferred to concentration camps where measures were applied to intensify migration pressure. The coordination between police units, SS commanders, and party officials evidenced a level of planning that anticipated methods that would later be used in occupied territories.

 German foreign policy allowed these procedures to be extended beyond the borders of the Reich. The occupation of the Sudatinland in October of 1938, authorized by the Munich agreement, offered the SS the possibility to apply in a newly incorporated environment control methods already tested internally.

 Operational teams were responsible for securing official buildings, seizing administrative records, purging local institutions, and identifying people considered potentially hostile. Thousands of arrests affected communists, Czech officials, and German citizens accused of disloyalty. The operation demonstrated the usefulness of deploying mobile units capable of accompanying military forces and quickly establishing a system of surveillance and control.

 In March of 1,939, the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia allowed this model to be deepened. The creation of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on the 16th of March incorporated territories with significant industrial infrastructure. The SS established regional offices responsible for supervising local administrations, controlling communications, making arrests, and ensuring the operation of factories vital to the German economy.

methods of interrogation, registration, and preventive detention similar to those used since 1,933 were applied. This experience demonstrated that it was possible to maintain production, reorganize institutions, and exercise political control with relatively limited resources as long as there existed a security apparatus capable of intervening from the first days of the occupation.

As these precedents were consolidated, the RSHA  developed internal discussions about the need for specialized units that could immediately follow the armed forces in the event of conflict. The experience accumulated since 1936 in information gathering allowed for the creation of lists like the Sundandong BH Poland prepared in 1939 from SD files.

 These lists included politicians, intellectuals,  religious leaders, nobles, trade unionists, and Jewish community representatives considered capable of organizing resistance. Their creation showed a systematic approach aimed at neutralizing the Polish elites from the very first days of a future occupation.

The planning followed precise administrative criteria. prior identification of targets, assignment of responsibilities, establishment of command chains, and definition of intervention methods. The selection of personnel for these units was oriented towards officers with legal, administrative or police training, accustomed  to working with detailed documentation.

The main criterion was ideological loyalty complemented by experience in surveillance operations and the ability to act autonomously within general guidelines. The professionalization aimed to ensure that the assigned tasks were carried out regularly and documented precisely  avoiding improvisations that could interfere with the reorganization of the occupied territory.

 During August of 1,939, coordination meetings adjusted the operational parameters of these groups. Their functions included securing public buildings, confiscating files, arresting people on previously compiled lists, and establishing surveillance systems that facilitated German administration. The guidelines transmitted by Hydrich emphasized that the existence of Polish political structures that could organize resistance must  not be allowed.

The phrase attributed to Hitler, according to which where there were Polish leaders, they should be eliminated, summarized the strategic orientation of these operations. On the 1st of September 1939, when the German divisions crossed the Polish border, the units prepared during the previous years advanced behind them.

They not only accompanied the military movement, but also carried with them an administrative framework, target lists, and procedures designed to turn the occupation into a process of political and social reorganization, guided by racial and security criteria that would mark the following months.

 The advance of the German forces through Polish territory immediately created a scenario in which the special units deployed by the SS began to operate with functions different from those of the combat troops. Their presence was integrated into the administrative device that accompanied the occupation, but their mission was aimed at identifying and eliminating groups previously defined as potential threats to German authority.

These units operated in regions assigned to each army, although their directives came directly from the central security operators in Berlin. Coordination with military commands was limited to matters of transit and access to operational areas, as their objectives did not depend on tactical needs of the battlefield.

 In the first weeks, the special teams relied on documentation developed before the war to locate people considered capable of sustaining Polish political or cultural structures. Arrests were organized through orders transmitted to local police stations and support units familiar with the area. In different locations, the teams traveled in light vehicles, carried out selective arrests, and conducted shootings in nearby wooded areas or quaries.

 The operations followed a uniform pattern, raiding homes, transferring to provisional detention centers, and executing in small groups. Reports sent to higher authorities recorded numbers of detainees and executed individuals classified by professional or political category which allowed for the evaluation of the fulfillment of the objectives established for each region.

The involvement of auxiliary organizations formed by ethnic Germans residing in Poland contributed to expanding the operational capacity of these units. The local militias trained during the months leading up to the war, acted as guides, identified Polish neighbors deemed hostile, and provided information about community structures.

Their intervention was especially visible in Western regions, where they carried out joint actions with German units in mass arrests and shootings. The intensity of their violence and disciplinary problems led German authorities to dissolve these formations shortly after the initial occupation. But their early involvement had demonstrated the usefulness of local forces in maintaining social control in newly occupied areas.

 As the security apparatus consolidated its presence, the elimination of Polish elites acquired a regional dimension through successive operations coordinated from German administrative offices. In various provinces, special teams conducted campaigns aimed at preventing educational, religious, or cultural institutions from reorganizing under the occupation.

 The arrest of figures linked to universities, schools, parishes, or local governments was in response to orders transmitted from security service offices and executed by personnel trained in the identification and classification of detainees. The deportation of groups of university professors from Kov to concentration camps during November 1,939 illustrated this process characterized by administrative procedures that prioritized the elimination of social leaders.

 In parallel, the German administration adopted specific measures in areas annexed directly to the Reich. In those regions, some commanders applied methods already known within Germany. in psychiatric institutions and medical centers. Shootings, deliberate negligence in living conditions, and the use of toxic gases in improvised facilities or adapted vehicles were recorded.

 These methods did not constitute a unified system, but they showed the transfer to Poland of procedures previously developed. Some of the personnel involved in those methods had participated in internal programs whose centralized structure was officially dismantled during 1941 which facilitated their reassignment to tasks in occupied zones.

 The presence of this personnel in Poland contributed to the expansion of murder techniques by gas in some specific locations, always under the supervision of security authorities and in coordination with local administrations. Although these actions affected specific sectors of the population, the measure that most transformed the urban landscape of the major Polish cities was the concentration of the Jewish population in designated areas.

 This policy was implemented progressively over the months following the occupation. In medium-sized towns, the delineation of specific neighborhoods was organized through police orders and carried out with the participation of municipal administrations under German supervision. The creation of the Wajj ghetto in February 1940 represented one of the first cases in which an urban district was designated as closed, separated from the rest of the city by fences and checkpoints.

 The forced relocation was carried out within short deadlines, resulting in massive population movements under poorly planned sanitary conditions. The complete closure in May established a system of isolation that combined permanent surveillance with insufficient rations, scarce supply, and extreme  overcrowding conditions.

 The process reached its widest expression in Warsaw, where the German administration decreed precise geographical limits for the area intended for the Jewish population. The compulsory relocation had to be completed within a span of weeks, and the definitive closure installed walls and barbed wire that divided entire neighborhoods.

 The ghetto functioned as a separate entity with controlled access and restricted contact with the rest of the city. The resulting population density, much higher than that of any other urban district in the capital, generated persistent health problems, including the spread of diseases and mortality associated with malnutrition.

Internal administration was delegated to Jewish councils appointed by the German authorities responsible for organizing forced labor, ration distribution, and maintaining order. The police established inside the ghetto acted under German supervision, regulating movement, trade and the functioning of community services.

 The economic functions assigned to the ghettos varied according to the region. In Wajj, the German administration developed workshops oriented towards the production of textile goods and equipment for military units. The activity was organized through a work system that allowed for obtaining cheap labor in isolation conditions.

 The residents received rations calculated to maintain minimum subsistence levels which ensured the continuity of production without the need for additional investments. In Warsaw, where there was a greater number of small workshops, the productive structure was more fragmented, although it responded to the same logic of intensive exploitation combined with health and food restrictions.

The German administration periodically evaluated the productivity of the workers and adjusted rations, permits, and activities according to military and economic needs. During this same period, the special teams responsible for security operations continued to systematize procedures derived from previous experiences.

The organization of executions, the digging of graves, and the transport of detained groups were standardized through instructions transmitted from central offices. The reports produced after each operation used administrative terminology that described detentions, interrogations, and executions without directly alluding to their lethal nature.

 The classification of victims according to political, religious or ethnic criteria allowed statistics to be compiled and archived in Berlin. This documentation reflected the evolution of the methods applied and provided senior commanders with precise information on the operational capacity of units deployed in different regions. The selection of commanders and subordinate  personnel showed continuity with pre-war practices.

 Many came from legal, police or administrative institutions with a university education and experience in archive work, report writing or office management. This background facilitated the application of standardized procedures from classifying detainees to drafting operation reports. The hierarchical structure allowed for quick transmission of orders and ensured that operations in different regions shared similar methods.

 The experience acquired in Poland improved coordination between units and reinforced practices that would later be applied in larger territories. Personnel who had worked with search lists, files, and classification procedures acquired knowledge that would be integrated into security apparatus guidelines when planning subsequent operations.

Meanwhile, the military advance and the consolidation of the German administration allowed for the reorganization of Polish territorial structures in areas directly incorporated into the Reich. German authorities integrated civil registries, restructured transportation networks, and reorganized municipal institutions.

In the general government, the central administration based in Kov established departments responsible for overseeing the economy, justice, communications, and security. These regional structures relied on the work of special units to identify groups considered dangerous. The information obtained through interrogations and analysis of confiscated documentation fed into databases that contributed to defining operational priorities.

  In this context, special teams took part in internal deportations aimed at reorganizing populations, moving entire groups from rural areas to urban centers where Jewish communities or Polish groups selected for forced labor were concentrated. The experience accumulated in these processes generated operational conclusions that would influence decisions taken during 1,941.

The ability to coordinate mass detentions, manage population relocations, and conduct elimination operations over a broad territory provided higher command with a foundation to expand instructions in more extensive regions. The constant interaction between administrative offices, special units, and local auxiliary forces allowed for refinement of territorial control methods.

 The accumulated documentation revealed a progression from selective operations against elites to broader procedures affecting entire communities through confinement, exploitation, and targeted elimination. In the months leading up to the summer of 1941, the German administration evaluated these practices based on strategic objectives that went beyond the Polish occupation.

 The conclusions drawn from the period between the autumn of 1939 and the spring of 1941 demonstrated that it was possible to integrate security actions into military and administrative operations without the need for large-scale additional structures.  The combination of selective shootings, confinement in ghettos, use of auxiliary forces, and employment of technical methods of murder provided an adaptable operational model.

 When planning for operations in Eastern Europe began, these experiences served as a reference to define functions, procedures, and unit structures that would operate in a much larger territory. The sum of these practices formed a precedent that would directly influence the deployment of special units in regions that would be incorporated into the conflict during 1941.

The campaign in Poland thus became a process of logistical and administrative learning whose continuity would be perceived in the operations that accompanied the military advance towards the Soviet Union during the following months. The German advance into the interior of the Soviet Union in June of 1,941 created an operational scenario in which the special units deployed by the security apparatus received expanded functions compared to those they had performed in Poland.

 Prior planning had established that the campaign in the east should not be governed by conventional rules of war and various directives linked to political command indicated that Soviet institutions considered essential for the cohesion of the communist regime should be neutralized from the first days. In this context, the structure of the Inzatk group adopted a form that allowed following closely with the army groups in their advance towards the Baltic states, Bellarus, Ukraine, and the southern regions.

 Four main units designated as Enzat group A, B, C, and D were assigned to each of the army groups deployed on the eastern front. Each unit was divided into smaller commands prepared to intervene in urban and rural areas as soon as the military forces occupied territory. Although their presence depended on the military advance, their operational activity was directed from the central security apparatus which gave them autonomy to act based on priorities established before the start of the campaign.

 Their composition brought together personnel from the Gestapo, Krypo, SD, and SS formations trained for tasks of identification, interrogation, and execution. This combination ensured that they could operate immediately as the front advanced. The final instructions transmitted to their commanders specified the need to locate and execute political officials linked to the Soviet regime as well as individuals identified as potential  threats to German control.

 Initial targets included Red Army commissars, party structure leaders, and specific administrative officials. These directives were expanded in the first few weeks of operations as German commanders assessed the local situation in each region. The ideological association established by the German regime between Soviet structures and the Jewish population led to an expansion of targets, resulting in executions that affected entire communities.

 The verbal orders transmitted by higher commanders during the summer of 1941 consolidated this orientation such that the groups no longer acted solely against political personnel but also against populations classified into ethnic or religious categories considered hostile. The operational procedure that was consolidated after the first few weeks showed a regularity that was replicated across the entire front.

 units arrived at a locality immediately after its military occupation. Their members met with local personnel willing to collaborate,  received information about residents considered relevant for the Soviet administration, and organized gathering operations in public spaces. Orders to appear were disseminated through posters,  announcements, or local intermediaries, which allowed large groups of people to be gathered in a short period of time.

Once gathered, the groups were transported by vehicles or marched on foot to selected locations outside urban centers. Executions were carried out at those points with firearms following procedures aimed at speed and maximum utilization of the available terrain. After each operation, the report sent to headquarters included numbers of executed individuals, categories assigned to the victims, and observations on the conditions of the region.

Enzat’s grouper A operated in areas that included Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, following Army Group North. Its commander, France Stallica, organized contacts with local groups willing to collaborate with the Germans and used this network to carry out arrests and shootings as soon as German troops occupied each city.

 The reports sent to Berlin during the first months documented executions in large quantities with numbers that increased rapidly in each locality. In countis, Ria and Vnius, ghettos were established after the first waves of shootings allowing the concentration of surviving population in controlled spaces where new elimination operations were subsequently organized.

 The activity of the command of Inzat’s grouper A showed how local knowledge and collaboration of organized groups in the Baltic states facilitated the execution of large-scale operations in the area corresponding to army  group center. Enins grouper B advanced through Bellarus towards Smolinsk.

 The region had geographical features that affected the mobility of units, vast forested areas, scattered populations and early partisan activity. Despite these difficulties, the operations followed the same pattern observed in the Baltic states. Selective arrests, mass shootings on the outskirts of cities, and the use of local auxiliary personnel to secure perimeters and maintain order during executions.

Minsk became a central point of activity with repeated operations affecting thousands of people in the first months of occupation. Inzat’s group of B units documented these actions in regular reports that recorded numbers, categories of victims, and observations on the situation in each district. To the south, Eninsat group operated in large Ukrainian cities.

 Their units entered Jettoir, Berdichev, Nikollay, and other locations, organizing shootings that followed a uniform pattern. identification of the Jewish population through local registries, concentration at designated points, transfer to peripheral areas, and execution. The availability of Soviet infrastructures previously used as administrative or police  centers facilitated the initial organization of arrests.

 The reports sent from this region showed that the numbers of victims increased significantly as the summer of 1941 progressed, reflecting the strategy of eliminating entire communities in a few operations. The units assigned to this region frequently used local aim personnel who participated in surveillance, transportation, and control of concentrated groups which increased operational capacity in a vast territory.

 The best known operation within this area was carried out on the outskirts of Kiev at the end of September  of 1941. After the occupation of the city, military and security authorities organized meetings to decide measures against the local Jewish population. All Jewish residents were ordered to report to a specific area of the city on September 29th with precise instructions about belongings and documents.

 The turnout exceeded initial forecasts, which allowed for an execution operation in 2 days that affected tens of thousands of people. The chosen location, a ravine located a short distance from the urban center, facilitated burial due to the natural depth of the terrain. The figures transmitted to Berlin through reports from the responsible s commando reflected the magnitude of the executions carried out in that interval.

Operations of similar characteristics took place in other cities, adapting to the available terrain and the urban structure of each locality. At the southern end of the front, Insat group D assigned to the 11th army operated in southern Ukraine, Crimea, and regions close to the Caucuses. Coordination with Romanian forces allowed the extension of their operations in areas where various ethnic communities coexisted.

 The units carried out shootings in rural areas and port cities following procedures already applied in other regions. Reports sent to Berlin included estimates of victims and observations on local conditions. The vast distances and geographical diversity required high mobility of the commands which had to secure newly occupied populations before administrative structures specific to each region were reestablished.

Operational reports known as Aragnis Meldongan constitute a central source for understanding the extent of these operations. In them, commanders uniformly described arrests, executions, and security measures. Each document included exact numbers of victims classified by categories, providing the central apparatus with a continuous view of the situation on the Eastern Front.

The sequence of reports was maintained for months, generating a detailed record of operations in hundreds of locations. This documentation reflected both shooting activities and control operations, interrogations, confiscation of documents, and collaboration with military units. The participation of local auxiliary forces was significant in all regions.

 In the Baltic states, Bellarus, Ukraine, and Bessarabia, organized groups assumed roles of identification, surveillance, and  control at concentration points. Their members conveyed information about residents, accompanied patrols, and supervised access to execution zones. This collaboration allowed for increased operational capacity in extensive regions where German commands did not have enough personnel to carry out all necessary tasks.

 The diversity of motivations among these auxiliaries is not reflected in the operational documents which are limited to recording their participation and assigned functions. As the campaign progressed, the special units faced difficulties related to  logistics, geographical dispersion, and availability of personnel.

 Although executions continued to be the main method of elimination, some commands began to use procedures that had already been tested in other territories by employing vehicles adapted to introduce toxic gases into closed compartments. At this stage, these methods were used in a limited manner and did not replace executions, but they allowed for a reduced need to concentrate large teams of shooters in certain operations.

 Their use was recorded in reports from units operating in southern and central areas. By the end of 1,942, the accumulated figures in the security apparatus reports reflected mass executions affecting entire communities in the occupied territories. These figures included the Jewish population, Soviet officials, personnel linked to the party, and other groups classified as threats to German control.

 Operations varied by region, but all showed continuity in procedures, structure, and organization. The military advance and stabilization of front lines modified the operational conditions which forced an adjustment of methods and distribution of personnel. The scale reached during this period defined the character of subsequent operations and set a precedent for decisions that would be adopted in the following year of the war when the territorial situation and strategic objectives experience significant changes. Throughout 1942, reports sent

from the regional commands of the security apparatus recorded operations carried out in multiple areas of the Eastern Front. These documents described movements of units, procedures applied in newly occupied localities, territorial control measures, and actions related to the administration of populations subjected to specific regulations.

The variations between regions reflected geographic differences and the uneven presence of partisan activities, but the reports followed a uniform format that allowed for the evaluation of the state of each district and the adjustment of deployments when necessary. The progressive stabilization of certain front lines influenced the pace of these operations, introducing changes in the distribution of personnel and in coordination with other military and police structures.

 This documentation offered a continuous view of the functioning of the security system in an environment that was experiencing constant modifications due to military evolution. The meeting was held after various agencies had been instructed to reorganize the management of the Jewish population in territories under Reich control.

 Hydrich presented approximate figures of Jewish communities in Europe, including both occupied areas and neutral or nonoccupied countries that the regime considered within its political projection. The protocol drafted after the meeting used administrative terminology specific to the security apparatus such as evacuation, resettlement, and special treatment without specifically detailing operational procedures.

 For the departments involved, these terms corresponded to measures already applied in Eastern Europe since the start of the military campaign in 1,941. The meeting also addressed issues of legal classification. Categories related to people with partial Jewish ancestry, mixed marriages, and particular situations related to war veterans and essential workers were discussed.

 These clarifications sought to standardize criteria among agencies managing civil records, residence permits, work authorizations, and police procedures. Administrative coordination was necessary because different occupied regions applied divergent interpretations of the racial provisions established by the regime.

 Vance served to align procedures and establish priorities in the management of records, transportation, and supervision. In parallel with these administrative measures, the year 1,942 marked the consolidation of a system of fixed extermination centers located in Polish occupied territory. Facilities such as Belgeek, Soibore, and Trebinka began operating during the first half of the year following directives transmitted from the central security apparatus.

 These facilities along with Chomno and the expansion of infrastructures in Ashvitz Burkanau assumed functions of eliminating large contingents of the population. In this process, the Inzat group progressively reduced their direct participation in mass shooting operations in urban areas and concentrated on complimentary tasks that included escorting transports, liquidation of ghettos, supporting deportations, and participating in security operations in rural areas.

Their activity was integrated into a broader system that combined fixed centers, railway transport, and territorial administration. In regions like Bellarus, Ukraine, and the Caucasus, units linked to the security police continued to participate in operations aimed at controlling areas where partisan activities  persisted.

 The antipartisan operations coordinated with units of the Waffan SS and order police included village inspections, arrests, destruction of infrastructure, and reprisal measures documented in reports sent to regional and central offices. These operations followed procedures established by local commands, adjusted to geographical conditions, and the presence of active armed groups in wooded areas.

 The relationship between antipartisan operations and security measures implemented by the Inzat group reflected progressive adaptation to a scenario in which the mobile warfare of 1941 had given way to a more stable front. In this context, the leadership of the security police adopted measures aimed at eliminating material traces of executions carried out since 1941.

In the spring of 1942, decisions were made to create a structure responsible for locating, exuming, and destroying human remains buried in mass graves located in occupied territories of Eastern Europe. The general order was transmitted from central offices and was assigned to a specific command, Paul Global, whose unit received functional designation to coordinate these tasks under the supervision of the security operators.

 The operation, later known as action  105, was considered confidential and was organized through verbal instructions and classified documents. Before initiating large-scale operations, technical trials were conducted to determine suitable methods for the destruction of human remains and associated materials. These trials were conducted in locations where large-scale executions had previously taken place and where large graves existed.

 The results of these tests made it possible to define applicable procedures in different terrains from wooded areas to regions near extermination centers. The resulting instructions established techniques for exumation, methods of combustion, reduction of remains and rearial in previously used areas. Necessary structures were also defined such as platforms constructed with local materials and ventilation systems to accelerate combustion processes.

 The unit in charge of the operation was organized into mobile teams composed of security police personnel and the ordinongs politai. Their task was to travel to previously identified locations, supervise exumations and apply procedures defined in technical instructions. For these tasks, labor was used composed of prisoners selected based on availability and terrain conditions.

 These groups performed excavations, transportation of remains, construction of temporary structures, and complimentary tasks. The movements of these units were documented through periodic reports that detailed places visited, number of graves treated, and general progress of the operation. The first activities organized under this program were carried out in areas linked to extermination centers in Poland.

 In regions like Chomno, Belett and Trebinka, exumations of previous graves were carried out and combustion techniques defined during the trials were applied. In these places, there were large pits containing remains buried for several months prior. The units proceeded to reorganize the terrain, remove layers of earth, install necessary structures and complete reduction processes within a limited time frame due to military changes in the region.

 At each site, the units documented applied procedures  and sent reports to the central command responsible for supervising the operation. As the war progressed and the front lines changed, the action 1,05 units moved to more eastern territories to deal with graves located in areas where mass executions had taken place in 1,941 and 1,942.

Regions such as Ukraine, Bellarus, and the Baltic states were the focus of these operations. The units had to act quickly due to the advance of the Red Army, which could reach locations before they were dealt with. The constant movement required reorganizing teams, creating local subunits, and coordinating activities with regional commands.

 These operations extended until the end of 1,944 when military conditions made it unfeasible to continue moving technical equipment to hard-to-reach  areas. In parallel with the development of action 1005, the activity of the Enzat group continued to adapt to the evolution of the war. In regions where active  ghettos still remained, security police units participated in their liquidation.

 These operations consisted of concentrating the remaining population, organizing railway transports to extermination centers, or proceeding with shootings nearby when the railway infrastructure was insufficient or non-existent. In rural areas, the Inzat Groupen participated in joint operations aimed at securing communications, protecting supply lines, and responding to attacks by armed groups.

 Documentation of these operations was regularly sent to regional offices, and in specific cases to the central security apparatus. The progressive loss of territory by the German army during 1943 and 1944 directly affected the operational capacity of these units. The retreat from Ukraine during the second half of 1943 forced the withdrawal of equipment assigned to antipartisan operations and the reorganization of personnel.

 The Soviet advances to the west, especially after the larger scale military operations initiated in the summer of 1944 further reduced the maneuvering room of these teams. The destruction of army group center and the recovery of Bellarus by the red army during operation BRAN forced the evacuation of numerous towns that had served as regional bases for security units.

 At the end of 1944, the operational structure of the Insat group on the eastern front had lost cohesion. Part of its personnel was integrated into combat units of the Vwaffan SS or transferred to administrative tasks in detention centers  and camps located in territories still under German control. Some smaller units remained in the Baltic regions and parts of Hungary for a limited period, but their role was restricted to support tasks in deportations and localized antipartisan operations. The reduction of areas under

German control progressively reduced the operational space in which they could act which led to their practical dissolution even before formal orders regarding this were issued. The total number of victims attributed to the Inzatk group and associated units during the period of operations in Eastern Europe has been estimated by various historical sources within a broad range due to the variety of regions, duration of operations and the existence of local auxiliary units that were not always recorded in formal reports. The most

cited estimates place figures that exceed several hundreds of thousands of people during this final phase, including Jewish population, Soviet prisoners of war, individuals classified as collaborators of the Soviet regime, and populations affected by antipartisan operations. This documentation partially preserved in reports prepared by regional commanders was later used to establish the magnitude of activities carried out by these units within the framework of broader security apparatus operations. With the German retreat

during the last months of 1944 and the loss of most of the occupied eastern territories, the activities of the Enzats group and the units assigned to action 1005 concluded as a direct result of the strategic change on the eastern front. The structures that had operated since 1941 ceased to function in an environment that no longer allowed the continuity of mobile operations or the maintenance of technical equipment intended to manipulate remains in mass graves.

 Their operational disappearance reflected the general change in the course of the war in which military priorities decisively altered the possibility of sustaining control structures that had characterized the previous years. The German capitulation of May 8th, 1945 caused an administrative collapse that left thousands of military and police officials linked to occupation and extermination operations in Eastern Europe scattered.

 The destruction of central structures, the closing of regional offices, and the hasty evacuation during the last months of the war created a scenario in which former members of the SS, the security police, and other associated units attempted to conceal identity through forged documents, change of residence, or integration into columns of displaced  civilians.

 The Allied powers initiated selective arrests based on lists compiled from captured files, statements taken on the ground, and administrative records recovered in localities that had served as regional headquarters. This initial phase resulted in arrests aimed  primarily at preventing escapes and ensuring the preservation of documentation useful for subsequent investigations.

During 1945, different territories liberated by the Red Army organized judicial processes in which Soviet military tribunals participated. These proceedings had already begun before the end of the war, but gained greater scope after the German capitulation. In cities like Minsk, Ria or Karkov, trials were held in which commanders and personnel of security units that had operated in Soviet territory appeared.

 The tribunals were based on documentation gathered by Soviet commissions dedicated to investigating crimes committed in German occupied areas. In several cases, the sentences included capital punishment  executed in public places or nearby military facilities. These processes focused on those directly responsible for operations carried out in regions where abundant material evidence and local documentation were preserved after the German withdrawal.

 While these procedures advanced in the east, the western powers developed a broader judicial framework aimed at addressing responsibilities of the political, military, and administrative leadership of the regime. On November 20th, 1945, the International Military Tribunal was inaugurated in Nuremberg, whose statutes had been agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France.

 The tribunal prosecuted 22 high-ranking leaders representing central structures of the Nazi state. Among the documentation presented were reports prepared by security units on the Eastern Front used as supplementary evidence in charges related to systematic persecutions. Although the main trial did not specifically focus on the Inats group, it did establish legal principles that would be applied in subsequent trials.

individual responsibility for acts committed within the framework of criminal organizations and rejection of the defense based solely on obedience to superior orders. After the conclusion of the international military tribunal in October 1946, the United States took responsibility for organizing a series of additional proceedings known as the subsequent Nuremberg trials.

 Among them, the trial dedicated to the Inzat Groupen occupied a central place in the examination of crimes committed by mobile security units. The formal accusation was presented in July 1947 before military tribunal 2A. 24 defendants were included who had held commands at various levels within these formations from chiefs of entire groups to those responsible for subordinate commands.

 The main documentation consisted of operational reports sent to Berlin during the period from 1941 to 1943 along with administrative orders,  internal correspondence, and personal files. The trial began in September 1947. The sessions were  conducted through a systematic review of documents incorporated as evidence.

 The prosecution was structured on three charges: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in organizations declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal. The presentation of the case was essentially based on written records prepared by the defendants themselves and their subordinates during operations in Soviet regions.

 These documents recorded dates, locations, administrative categories used to classify victims, and the numbers of people executed, as well as procedures used to coordinate operations with military commands and other civil organizations. The defensive strategy focused on arguing that the actions of the units had been carried out in execution of higher orders.

 Various defendants acknowledged operations described in the reports, but claimed that the established chain of command required strict compliance with directives transmitted from central security police offices. The court examined these claims by comparing them with written directives, verbal orders documented in internal minutes, and testimonies of staff who  had had direct access to planning meetings.

The final assessment was that the existence of higher orders did not  exempt individual responsibility in the execution of measures that violated current international standards. The sentence was announced in April of 1948. Of the 22 remaining defendants, 14 were sentenced to death by hanging.

 The others received prison sentences ranging from life imprisonment to a limited duration. The written reasoning highlighted the systematic nature of documented operations, the administrative clarity with which they had been recorded, and the command position each defendant held. The sentence emphasized that the operational reports constituted direct documentation of actions taken prepared by staff with administrative training and experience in state structures.

 After the sentences, the convicted were transferred to the prison for war criminals in Lansburg, designated by American authorities as a detention center for people prosecuted in Nuremberg. In those years, West Germany was beginning the process of institutional reconstruction, which included the creation of new judicial structures and the adoption of a federal constitution.

 In 1949, the new Federal Republic abolished the death penalty, which generated internal debate about the application of capital sentences imposed by Allied tribunals.  This debate coincided with increasing pressure from political, ecclesiastical, and social sectors, requesting a revision of convictions and consideration of political factors related to the integration of West Germany into emerging Western alliances.

During 1950, United States officials continued to receive requests to review sentences passed in the later Nuremberg trials. The military administration and then the United States High Commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, received reports that evaluated the severity of crimes, the degree of individual participation, and the specific circumstances of each convict.

 Special committees analyzed cases of prisoners convicted by military tribunals, including those sentenced in the Inat Groupen trial. These reviews were based on court records, subsequent statements by the accused, and political considerations expressed by German authorities. On January 31st, 1,951, Mcclo announced the final decision on sentence commutation.

In the case of those convicted in the Ezats group and trial, four death sentences were confirmed. Otto Olandorf, Paul Global, Verer Browner, and Eric Nman. The rest were commuted to prison terms of varying lengths. This decision reflected both legal analysis of the files and political considerations associated with West Germany’s role in the postwar European reorganization.

The convicts whose sentences were confirmed remained in Lansburg awaiting execution while other prisoners began processes of progressive sentence reduction. The executions were carried out on the 7th of June 1951 at the prison facilities. On that same day, three other prisoners from different trials were also executed, fulfilling a total of seven capital sentences.

After these executions, the rest of the condemned continued their imprisonment in Lansburg, where new sentence reductions were later applied based on periodic reviews conducted by American and German authorities. The reductions considered behavior reports, health status, subsequent statements, and evaluation of changing political conditions.

During the first half of the 1950s, the number of prisoners convicted by Allied courts progressively decreased. As West Germany established its judicial system and expanded its functions, some responsibilities related to the incarceration and supervision of convicts were transferred to German federal authorities.

 This was  accompanied by early release processes applied to various prisoners. In the case of those convicted  in the Enzat group trial, several received significant reductions that allowed their release from prison before serving their original sentences. These decisions responded to administrative review criteria and positions adopted by German political authorities regarding the role of these prisoners in the context of West Germany’s international integration.

 The last group of convicts in the Enzat Grupen trial who remained in prison was released in 1958 after completing reduced periods of incarceration. With these releases, the phase of immediate justice related to crimes committed on the Eastern Front by these units concluded. The decisions made between 1945 and 1958 established an extensive documentary basis that would later be used by German judicial institutions in further investigations.

The transition from trials led by Allied powers to national judicial procedures would mark the next stage in the criminal treatment of crimes committed during the German occupation of Eastern Europe. in a context where captured archives, previous sentences, and administrative files would become fundamental elements for future investigations.

During the decade following 1,945, the judicial system of West Germany showed limited activity in the investigation of crimes linked to the Nazi regime. The political priority focused on economic reconstruction and on integrating the new state into western alliances. While judicial processes related to occupation crimes advanced only irregularly, the early releases of those convicted by Allied tribunals and the absence of national structures dedicated  to systematic investigation created a situation in which numerous cases

remained unexamined. The existing information was dispersed in regional archives, local prosecutor’s offices, and documents captured by Allied forces without an agency to coordinate their analysis. The scenario began to change in 1958. That year, a process developed in the city of M gained considerable attention within West Germany.

 The trial examined operations carried out by the Einats commando Tilsit in Lithuania during 1941 and brought together several defendants who had held intermediate positions within the Gestapo and SS. The presentation of original documents, administrative orders, and operation records clearly showed the decision-making structure that had guided the unit’s activities.

 The German prosecution led by Irvin Schuler highlighted the need for a broader and coordinated investigation as the available materials revealed that there was a significant amount of information that had not been judicially processed in the 13 years since the war. The Olm trial demonstrated that the judicial system of West Germany relied excessively on isolated reports, partial investigations, and administrative coincidences to initiate proceedings.

The absence of a central body meant that complex cases did not progress beyond preliminary stages. In response to the public attention generated by the trial, the ministers of justice of the federal states met  in October of 1958 to study the possibility of creating an institution dedicated exclusively to investigating crimes committed during the Nazi regime.

 The meeting concluded with the decision to establish a central office responsible for coordinating the collection of documentation, analyzing connections between scattered cases and preparing files for regional prosecutors. On the 1st of December 1958, the central office of the state justice administrations for the investigation of national socialist crimes began operating in Ludvigsburg.

 Its initial mandate included the investigation of crimes committed outside German territory, particularly in occupied areas in Eastern Europe, and focused on crimes perpetrated against civilians in contexts not  directly related to combat. Over time, its jurisdiction was gradually expanded through legislative amendments.

 In 1964, its jurisdiction was extended to crimes committed within West Germany, and the distinction between civilian victims and prisoners of war was eliminated. Finally, subsequent reforms removed temporal limits, allowing the office to investigate  war crimes without statute of limitations. Elvin Schuler was appointed as the first director of the office.

 His experience as a prosecutor in the Olm trial facilitated access to German and American documentation, especially the files of the Berlin document center administered by American forces since the end of the war. Through this work, the office began to build an extensive collection of files, operational reports, internal orders, and administrative correspondence related to crimes committed in Eastern Europe between 1939 and 1945.

This documentation made it possible to reconstruct command structures, identify those responsible, and establish connections between scattered units. However, Schuler’s career ended abruptly in 1966 after revelations about his own affiliation with the Nazi party in 1937 and his membership in the SA.

 Although no direct criminal responsibilities were ever established, the controversy led to his resignation. Despite the initial difficulties, the Ludvigsburg office established itself as the central archive for investigations related to the Nazi regime. Its researchers worked with documentation from German, Polish, Soviet, and other European archives.

 This cooperation allowed for the reconstruction of operations carried out by SS units, security police, Gestapo, Vermacht, concentration camp personnel, and civil offices involved in deportations. The office generated reports that were sent to regional prosecutors who initiated preliminary proceedings and when there was sufficient evidence full judicial processes.

 Since its creation, the institution has contributed directly to thousands of individual investigations. Even so, the legal processes face significant obstacles. The judicial system of West Germany had inherited a considerable number of judges and prosecutors who had worked during the Nazi era which resulted in restrictive interpretations of the criminal law applied to crimes of the regime.

 German juristprudence tended to strictly distinguish between direct perpetrators and accompllices requiring precise proof of individual participation in concrete acts. This requirement made it difficult to prosecute cases where the documentation established general roles, administrative responsibility, or presence in command structures, but did not detail personal action in a specific event.

 Consequently, many defendants received reduced sentences or were acquitted. The processes developed in the 1960s and 1970s showed this trend. The Avitz trial in Frankfurt, held between 1963 and 1965, examined the actions of officials and guards from the complex. Although it incorporated abundant documentation and testimonies, only six defendants received life sentences, while others received sentences of limited duration.

 For many cases, the courts required direct proof of individual murder, a requirement difficult to meet given the time elapsed, the death of key witnesses, and the destruction of documents in the last months of the war. Another problem arose with the statute of limitations. The applicable legislation set a time limit of 20 years for the crime of murder.

This meant that in 1960, numerous crimes could fall outside of judicial competence. After public and parliamentary debates, the time limit was extended on two occasions and finally abolished in 1979. The elimination of the statute of limitations allowed investigations to continue without temporal restrictions, although many of the possible defendants had died or were in health conditions that prevented their prosecution.

In the following decades, the number of procedures varied depending on documentary findings and international cooperation. Many processes developed in the 1980s when the partial opening of archives in Eastern European countries allowed access to unpublished documents. However, most cases faced the aging of defendants, absence of direct witnesses, and the need to establish individual participation in highly bureaucratic systems.

 The case of John Dejanjuk in the 21st century introduced a significant change in German juristprudence. After investigations carried out in the United States and Europe, Demjanjuk was extradited to Germany in 2009  under accusation of having served as a guard at the Soibore extermination camp. The trial concluded in 2011 determined that his documented presence in the camp constituted functional participation in the process of murdering the deportes sent there.

 The court considered that the sole purpose of the camp was the elimination of deported individuals and that belonging to the operational staff implied direct contribution to the outcome. Therefore, it was established that it was not necessary to demonstrate a concrete act of murder committed by the accused.

 This precedent allowed for the initiation of additional investigations against low and medium-level personnel who had served in extermination or concentration camps. Starting in 2013, the Ludvigsburg office identified cases that could be prosecuted under the new legal interpretation. In the following years, German courts tried former staff members of Avitz and other camps.

 The case of Oscar Grooning, tried in 2015, applied the same criterion. His administrative role was considered part of the process that facilitated murders during his period of service. Reinhold Hanning was tried and convicted in 2016 on similar grounds. These procedures generated public debates about the usefulness and legitimacy of trials held so late.

 The advanced age of the accused and the impossibility of obtaining complete contemporary testimonies provoked discussions about the practical scope of criminal justice after several decades. However, the courts maintained that the absence of a time limit for the crime of murder obliged them to prosecute all cases where sufficient evidence existed.

By 2016, the number of potentially prosecutable people had diminished considerably. The Ludvigsburg office continued operations focusing on documentation, international cooperation,  and assistance to ongoing investigations, but most active cases were in advanced stages or had been closed due to the death of those involved.

 The work of the office allowed the consolidation of an extensive archive that integrated documents from several decades  of collection and analysis. Throughout the period from 1958 to 2016, research conducted by German institutions enabled the reconstruction of numerous cases linked to crimes by mobile units, camp personnel, and administrative bodies.

These investigations produced files, sentences, and archives that became a documentary basis for subsequent studies. The transition from limited interest in the 1950s to procedures developed under new legal interpretations in the 21st century showed the evolution of judicial approaches to crimes committed during the Nazi regime.

 The continuity of the work of the Ludvigsburg office provided a stable structure for the preservation of documents and for cooperation with judicial entities that in subsequent decades would assume increasing responsibilities in the examination of these crimes.